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Abstract:
Charitable contributions of "conservation easements" have since 1980 allowed
high-income taxpayers to shelter income from taxation through overvalued
deductions. Overvaluation has increased dramatically in the past 20 years: a 2016
study of all easement decisions since 1980 reported that while overvaluation had
averaged by a factor of two before 1994, it averaged by a factor of ten for
decisions between 1994 and 2016. SOI data disclose that aggregate easement
contributions deducted on Schedule A grew from $2.26 billion in 2015 to $6.5
billion in 2018 (the most recent year available). A recent report by supporters of
conservation easements acknowledges that "neither the [IRS] nor the courts have
sufficient resources to effectively police valuation abuse."
Most of the concern has been with "syndicated conservation easements" ("SCEs"),
and most proposed remedies to easement overvaluation focus on SCEs. We show,
however, that exactly the same traits that produce overvalued SCEs -- allowing
charitable deductions based on "fair market" value, which sanctions deducting
unrealized appreciation without taxing the corresponding gain, combined with the
unavoidable need to value contributed easements through as manipulable a process
as appraisal -- have facilitated abusive overvaluation of non-syndicated easements
too. That combination can leave an easement contributor better off than if she had
done anything else with the land, including selling it for its (true) fair market
value. The only effective solution to easement overvaluation is to restrict the
deductibility of easement contributions attributable to unrealized gain. To that end
we propose limiting charitable contributions of easements granted with respect to
recently acquired property initially to cost, much as Congress has previously done
with other contributions of appreciated property that are vulnerable to abuse,
while allowing that limitation to evolve with real estate values over time. We also
propose an upfront excise on unrealized appreciation in contributed easements, to
increase the salience to prospective contributors of the risks of overvaluation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"No good deed goes unpunished" would be a fitting description of the criticisms levelled at
the Internal Revenue Service for its pursuit through litigation of deductions claimed, pursuant to
I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3) and 170(h), for charitable contributions of conservation easements.1 It is a
pursuit in which the Service has prevailed more often than not. It has successfully challenged such
deductions on a variety of grounds, some of which might reasonably be characterized as technical,
the latter provoking much of the criticism. But the deductions the Service has challenged have also
routinely been overvalued, overvaluation that has been both persistent and growing.

In the

beginning at least, conservation easement contributions seem to have functioned in some measure as
Congress intended, providing (with relatively modest overvaluation) an incentive to conservation by
owners of land facing developmental pressures.2

Before 1994, according to one recent study,

deductions were overstated on average by a factor of about two; for cases between 2000 and 2016,
however, that had grown to more like a factor of ten.3 Recent decisions have continued to manifest
that trend.4
The escalating overvaluation has been effectuated principally by taxpayers claiming values,
based on the asserted developmental potential of property, that are many multiples of the price at
1

The allowance of a deduction for contributions of conservation easements was first made permanent by the Tax
Treatment Extension Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-541, § 6, 94 Stat. 3204 (1980). For context to the provision, see
Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better Way, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 32-35 (2011) [hereinafter Halperin, Better Way]; a more detailed account of the legislative
background may be found in Theodore Sims, Qualified Conservation Restrictions: Recollections of and Reflections on
the Origins of Section 170(h), 33 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 41, 44-45 (2013) [hereinafter Sims, Recollections].
2

Stephen Small's impression is that early contributions of conservation easements generally functioned to preserve
land long held by individual taxpayers, a state of affairs that changed with the emergence of syndicated easements
around the turn of the century. See generally Stephen J. Small, Proper -- And Improper -- Deductions for Conservation
Easement Donations, Including Developer Donations, 105 TAX NOTES 217 (2004) [hereinafter Small, Improper
Deductions]. Small was the principal drafter of the § 170(h) regulations, and has since continued to work extensively
in the area.
3

Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 225, 266-67
(2016) [hereinafter McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum]; see also Jay Starkman, Conservation Easements: The 21stCentury Abusive Tax Shelter, 159 TAX NOTES 1475 (2018)
4

As to individual cases, see, e.g., Belair Woods, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2018-159, at *18 (2018) ("This
valuation presupposed that the 141.15 acres had increased in value by 1,380% during the previous 2-1/2 years, amid the
worst real estate crisis since the Great Depression."); see also infra Part III.B.3.c. According to the Statistics of
Income, aggregate easement contributions reported on Schedule A grew from about $2.26 billion in 2015 to some $6.5
billion in 2018 (the latest year for which the data are available); at the same time contributions of land and real estate in
the aggregate (not including easements) were about $3.13 billion in 2015 and $3.16 billion in 2018, though they did
spike to about $3.9 billion in 2017 (possibly in anticipation of the decline in individual marginal rates in 2018). See
documentation at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-noncash-charitable-contributions. For all four
years 2015-2018 Easements were larger by average size of contribution ($606,500) than any other category of
contribution; the next highest by average size was "Other Investments" ($324,435).

which the property recently changed hands. The claimed values implausibly suggest that real estate
market prices have somehow, persistently, come nowhere close to reflecting the true developmental
values of land. They are nevertheless used to justify inflated deductions for the loss of value
claimed to result from restricting development of the land. Just as implausibly, the latter imply that
the conservation benefits flowing from easements are many times what someone wanting to conserve the underlying land would have had to pay contemporaneously to purchase the land itself.
Even putting that anomaly aside,5 and focusing just on the amounts claimed as deductions in recent
cases, they have become indefensibly inflated. That inflation is not, as many proposed solutions to
the problem assume, confined to essentially fraudulent "syndicated conservation easements"
("SCEs"), described in detail in a recent Bipartisan Investigative Report of the Senate Finance
Committee.6 Both prior analyses and more recent decisions illustrate that the entire landscape of
conservation easement contributions is littered with overvalued deductions. Any remedy premised
on the assumption that SCEs are the extent of the problem is destined to leave a great deal of
conservation easement abuse untouched. SCEs are just a particularly visible manifestation of a
more fundamental problem.
The overvaluation of SCEs, and the valuation of conservation easements more generally,
rest on a common foundation. For income tax purposes the amount allowed as a deduction on the
contribution of property (other than money) to a charity is generally its "fair market value."7 That
allowance, while a long-standing and familiar feature of the income tax, is at odds with virtually
every other income tax provision governing property dispositions: it permits contributors to take
deductions for unrealized appreciation without ever taxing the corresponding built-in gain.8 The
singular generosity of this "appreciated property rule" is transformed into a serious vulnerability by
the fact that "fair market value" for purposes of a charitable contribution is intrinsically
5

The discrepancy between the amounts claimed as deductions for easements and the value of the interests they
conserve is an important aspect of this problem that has been emphasized in particular by Daniel Halperin. See Halperin, Better Way, supra note 1. That dimension raises questions of commensurability that are beyond the scope of this
paper. See infra note 49.
6

S. COMM. ON FIN., 116TH CONG., SYNDICATED CONSERVATION-EASEMENT TRANSACTIONS: BIPARTISAN
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, AS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN GRASSLEY AND RANKING MEMBER WYDEN (Comm. Print
2020) [hereinafter SENATE BIPARTISAN REPORT].
7

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2); see infra Part III.A.

8

See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-In
Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Halperin, Appreciated Property]; Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 263, 268 (2013) [hereinafter Colinvaux,
Broken System]; Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 44-45. In almost all other circumstances the amount deductible
on disposition is limited to that part of the property's value that is already tax-paid, that is, to its adjusted basis. See
infra Part III.A. Halperin’s analysis leads him to advocate constructive realization on most charitable contributions of
appreciated property. Halperin, Appreciated Property, supra, at 4. Colinvaux’s analysis leads him to advocate denying
deductions for almost all contributions other than in cash. Colinvaux, Broken System, supra, at 323-29.

2

counterfactual. It is the price at which an arm's-length transfer by a hypothetical "willing seller" to
an equally hypothetical "willing buyer" is imagined to take place. Actual charitable contributions of
property, however, by their very nature are never truly at "arm's length": there is no real adversity
of interests; the recipient-donee, in contrast with a real arm's-length purchaser for value, has no
incentive to minimize the price that it is (not) required to pay. By the same token, the fair market
value hypothesized by the Treasury Regulations must always be externally supplied. For some
assets -- those that are fungible and regularly traded, most commonly corporate stock -- external
prices are readily and reproducibly available. For assets that are not fungible and for which sales
are fewer and farther between -- real estate and art are examples -- ascertaining fair market value
can be considerably more beset by uncertainty. Introduce into that uncertainty the fact that neither
donor nor recipient has any interest in minimizing the value assigned to the contribution -- a higher
valuation makes the donor better off but does not leave the recipient (who isn't actually paying
anything) any worse off -- and you have an incentive, and a recipe, for overvaluation.
The appreciated property rule has long been the Achilles heel of the charitable deduction in
general, as Congress at times has expressly acknowledged.9 It has wrestled with the resulting
valuation problems off and on for over forty years. Much of the tax system's machinery for combatting valuation abuse, introduced into the statute beginning in 1981, has responded, implicitly or
explicitly, to aggressiveness in valuing charitable contributions. But even with the most challenging
of conventional valuation problems there is usually some more or less salient set of prices from
more (or less) comparable arm's-length sales to which one can eventually appeal.

What is

qualitatively different about conservation easements is that they essentially never change hands,
much less at arm's length. Consequently, in valuing them, there are no comparable property
interests to the market prices of which it is possible to appeal. Their "fair market values" must
instead be determined by indirect methods that, more often than not, are suffused with speculation
and imprecision. The resulting malleability of conservation easement valuation has intensified the
temptation to exploit the more general incentive identified above to overvalue charitable contributions. With the passage of time that confluence of inducements has led to the overvaluation of
contributed easements that, in both depth and extent, has become simply intolerable. SCEs are just
the tip of that iceberg.
Even those prepared to acknowledge and address the overvaluation of conservation easements have either overlooked or ignored but in all events skirted this central dimension of the
problem. Many of the analyses and "solutions" that have been proposed are peripheral, misguided,
or both. Katherine Jordan and Douglas Longhofer, for example, argue that the Service should stop
9

See infra Part III.A.2.

3

"ensnar[ing] legitimate conservation transactions" in "supposed technical violations in easement
deeds," and confine its enforcement efforts to challenging SCEs, syndicated through pass-through
entities, as "shams."10 Of like mind about the shortcomings of the Service's efforts, though of a
diametrically contrasting view about the appropriate response, is the Tax Court's Honorable Mark
Holmes, who has opined that the IRS should stop harassing "reasonably valued" conservation easements with "contestable" technical challenges and just feed all the disputes "into a valuation
grinder," thereby weeding out all those "presumably . . . reasonably valued" claimed conservation
easement deductions that he "fear[s]" the government's efforts have needlessly jeopardized, from the
"syndicated conservation-easement deals with wildly inflated deductions on land bought at much
lower prices."11 Some among the conservation easement community are prepared to go so far as to
deny that a valuation problem actually exists. For example, a recent, 129-page "unofficial" report,
prepared by an ABA Section on Real Property, Trust & Estates Law "Task Force,"12 devotes 100 or
so pages (replete with 28 detailed examples) to proposed post-contribution liberalizations of the
treatment of conservation easements, and a few pages to rehashing (or disparaging) proposals by
others to curb overvaluation, while collectively offering no "judgment about the extent to which
valuation of conservation easements represents a tax issue that merits priority attention."13 Nor can
we fail to mention Mr. Robert Ramsay, Chair of the "Partnership for Conservation," who asserts
that one of many "myths" about conservation easements is that the "development rights" to a parcel
of realty "cannot exceed the value of the land."14 There has even been a suit, filed in April 2021 by
10

Katherine S. Jordan & Douglas L. Longhofer, Eroding Conservation, Preserving Abuse -- A Flawed IRS Strategy, 169 TAX NOTES 1259, 1260 (2020).
11

Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 154 T.C. 180, 258-59 (2020) (Holmes, J., dissenting), aff’d, No. 202117 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2022).
12

ABA Real Property, Trust & Estate Law Section, Conservation Easement Task Force Report: Recommendations
Regarding Conservation Easements and Federal Tax Law, 53 REAL PROP. TR & EST. L.J. 245, 331-334 (2018)
[hereinafter ABA-RPTE Report]. The report was not presented to either the ABA House of Delegates or its Board of
Governors, and "is not the ABA's official position." Id. at 247. At least some task force members are acknowledged to
have clients with conservation easement issues. The authors' collective disclaimer is notable for its careful wording:
Although some members of the Task Force have clients who would be affected by the federal income tax principles addressed by this Report, or have advised clients on the application of such rules,
neither a Task Force member nor the firm or organization to which any member belongs has been
engaged by a client to make a government submission with respect to, or otherwise to influence the
development or outcome of, the specific subject matter of this Report.
Id.
13

Id. at 331.

14

Robert Ramsay, A Dirty Dozen Myths About Conservation Easements and One Sad Truth, 167 TAX NOTES FEDSmall, et al., Some Dirty Realities About Syndicated Conservation Easements, 167
Jordan & Longhofer have endeavored in detail to justify that assertion in print.
Jordan & Longhofer, supra note 10, at 641. Contra William E. Ellis, The "Secret" to Syndicated Conservation Easement Valuations Revealed, 169 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 2011 (2020). We discuss that claim infra Part III.B.2.
ERAL 639 (2020). Contra Stephen J.
TAX NOTES FEDERAL 1729 (2020).

4

three appraisers in the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that the IRS has engaged in a pattern of
harassment, and seeking (among other things) to enjoin it from enforcing § 6695A, which imposes
penalties on appraisers whose work leads to overvaluation penalties.15
There are, to be sure, more moderate voices. Stephen Small, for example, is of the view
that, in the two decades immediately following the 1980 adoption of § 170(h), "open space with
important wildlife habitat or wildlife corridors . . . owned by the same owners, or the same family,
for years . . . were typical of the properties protected by conservation easements."16 While Small
believes that in those early years the statute was working "the way Congress intended," he is critical
of the syndicated easement transactions that have emerged in the past fifteen to twenty years, and
has himself proposed remedial legislation.17 The work of Professor Nancy McLaughlin, who has
written in this area as extensively as anyone,18 suggests, on the other hand, a slightly different
perspective. Her 2016 study, in particular, discloses overvaluation reaching back to the beginning,
albeit far less aggressive before 1994 than it has since become. Much of what she documents has
occurred outside the realm of syndicated easements. So although Professor McLaughlin has been
unstinting in her efforts to facilitate the constructive use of conservation easements, she remains
cognizant of the flaws in existing practice, and in particular of the wider prevalence of
overvaluation. She, together with King Burnett and John Leshy, have proposed steps both to
standardize and make more stringent the terms on which conservation easements are granted, and
the ways in which they are administered and enforced following grant.19
Unfortunately, however, even those who view themselves as responsible advocates of conservation easements, and endorse efforts to curb syndicated easements, have not come to grips with
the deeper foundation of the problem. Academics like Nancy McLaughlin aside, there is little
15

Benson v. IRS, No. 2021-cv-00074 (N.D. Ga, April 4, 2021). See infra notes 69 and 142.

16

Stephen J. Small, A Modest Legislative Proposal to Shut Down Specific Tax Shelters, 151 TAX NOTES 1085, 1088
(2016) [hereinafter Small, Modest Proposal]; see also Small, Improper Deductions, supra note 2, at 218.
17

Small, Improper Deductions, supra note 2, at 218. Small's specific suggestion was that if an investor whose
holding period for their investment was less than 18 months claimed a deduction in excess of 250% of the investment,
their deduction would be limited to basis. Small, Modest Proposal, supra note 16, at 1086. The proposed 250%
threshold, presumably fixed so that a 40% investor would no more than break even on the investment, appears to have
been reflected in IRS Notice 2017-10, which treats syndicated easements that exceed that threshold as listed
transactions. It has also been incorporated into recent legislative proposals. While a step in the right direction, we
suggest below that we can and must do better than that. See infra Part IV.B.
18

See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Proceeds Regulation, 56 REAL PROP. TR. &
EST. L.J. 111 (2021) [hereinafter McLaughlin, Conservation Proceeds]; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Tax-Deductible
Conservation Easements and the Essential Perpetuity Requirements, 37 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2017); McLaughlin,
Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3; see also Starkman, supra note 3.
19

K. King Burnett, John D. Leshy, & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Building Better Conservation Easements for America
the Beautiful, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE (Sept. 15, 2021) [hereinafter "BLM"]. The article draws on the experience of the Department of Agriculture in purchasing easements.

5

evidence of a willingness even to admit to the prevalence of excessive valuation outside of syndicated easements; there is little acknowledgment of how many of the easements found in reported
decisions differ only quantitatively -- just in degree, and in how elaborate their window dressing -from the SCEs that more responsible easement advocates decry. Beyond that, the larger conservation easement community seems uninterested in -- almost studiously averse to -- confronting the
pivotal role played by the appreciated property rule in fueling overvaluation of conservation
easements, SCEs and non-syndicated easements alike.

It, together with the pliability of the

appraisal process on which valuation of conservation easements is compelled to rely,20 lies at the
core of this problem. Unless and until responsible members of the conservation community, or at
least those responsible for the formulation and administration of our income tax laws, acknowledge
and address that reality, recent proposals intended to curb the large and growing overvaluation of
conservation easement deductions almost surely will fail.
We survey in greater detail in Parts III and IV the sorts of solutions that have been proposed.
At this preliminary juncture we take note of just two. One is Judge Holmes' suggestion that the
entire problem might satisfactorily be addressed through case-by-case litigation of value. That has
long been criticized in individual cases as "an inefficient, wasteful, and inherently imprecise method
of resolving" valuation disputes.21 As a general approach it would be prohibitively expensive. The
purveyors of conservation easements are well-financed, well-represented, and determined;22 the
Internal Revenue Service's resources are limited. There is little reason to be confident, as the
volume of litigation continues to grow, that the Service will continue to be able to keep up. Even
advocates of liberality in allowing conservation easement deductions acknowledge that "neither the
Service nor the courts have sufficient resources to effectively police valuation abuses."23
The other consists of recent legislative proposals to limit, to 2.5 times investment, deductions for conservation easements claimed with respect to property held by a pass-through entity during the first three years of the investors' collective holding periods for their interests. That proposal
has been introduced in both houses of Congress.24 It is designed primarily to kill syndicated
20

E.g., Symington v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 892, 904 (1986); Thayer v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1977).

21

Losch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 921 (1988). A distinguished Tax Court Judge in one early case was
"appalled at the time and energy both the parties and the Court have had to expend in the course of trial and decision in
this case" on the matter of valuation. Symington v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 892, 904 (1986) (Tannenwald, J.); see infra Part
III.B.3.c. See generally Colinvaux, Broken System, supra note 8, at 283-85.
22

See Coal Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 153 T.C. 126, 140 n.4 (2019). The appellants in both Hewitt and Oakbrook Land Holdings, see infra note 110, were represented by a major New York firm. The defendants who have not
settled in United States v. Zak, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2019), see infra note 133, are comparably represented.
23

ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12, at 331-32. We return to that possibility, infra, at Part III.C.

24

S. 2256, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021); H.R. 4164, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021). The proposal was incorporated
into, and then dropped from, then pending infrastructure legislation. H.R. 5376, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021). The

6

easements of the sort described in the Senate Bipartisan Report, by imposing a hard, readily
identifiable limitation that would render SCEs uneconomic.25 It is, moreover, supported by what
might be described as the mainstream conservation easement community. But the focus on SCEs
has served to obscure just how much broader the problem really is. Even taken on its own terms
legislation like S. 2256 is flawed: it would apply only to easements contributed by pass-through
entities; even there it would have no effect on easements contributed by entities whose investors are
sufficiently patient to wait out its three-year limitation. More importantly, it might well have the
unfortunate collateral consequence of blessing easement valuations that exceed, but by less than 2.5
times, the contributor's basis, even when such valuation itself is -- as it often will be -- aggressive.
The simple fact is that the deduction for a contributed conservation easement should never
exceed (much less substantially surpass) the fair market value of the property with respect to which
the easement is granted. To claim otherwise is to say that giving away the development rights to
land is giving away more than the land -- lock, stock, and barrel -- itself. What is more, fair market
value should not be hard to determine when, as found in the facts of so many recent decisions, the
property involved had changed hands in a roughly contemporaneous arm's-length sale. In such
circumstances the limitation of S. 2256 to 2.5 times the recent sale price is plainly too generous.26
Flawed though it is, a bill like S. 2256 does point the way to an effective response to
conservation easement overvaluation. Deductions for easements donated with respect to recently
acquired property should in general be limited to adjusted basis, that is, to cost. That is the
proposed limitation presumably was inspired by the threshold for scrutiny as a listed transaction prescribed by Notice
2017-10, which in turn appears to have been inspired by suggestions by Small in Modest Proposal, supra note 13, at
1086; see also Small, Improper Deductions, supra note 2, at 223.
25

In contrast with most investments characterized as "tax shelters," the "economics" of SCEs are driven entirely by
the tax benefit produced by the charitable deduction in the year of contribution. Consequently, a positive return
requires the allowance of a deduction enlarged by comparison with the amount invested to more than I/t, where I is the
investment and t is the taxpayer's marginal rate. At a (rounded) top marginal rate of 40%, positive economics for each
$1.00 of investment would thus require a deduction of more than $1.00/0.40 = $2.50, which would then produce tax
savings of $1.00. That, presumably, is the origin of the threshold in Notice 2017-10, the limitation in bills like S. 2256,
and the earlier proposal by Small. At any lower marginal rate a 2.5x deduction, even if (taking into account the
percentage limitations of 170(b)) entirely allowed in the first year, would produce a negative return in the first year with
nothing to make up the shortfall thereafter. The 2.5x-for-3-years limitation of S. 2256 thus trades on the extreme
impatience to which tax-motivated conservation easement shelters are thought to cater.
Traditional shelters (like most investments generally) have involved tax benefits generated over time, with the
property that when discounted to present value the returns (including tax benefits) in the aggregate exceed the original
investment; that is, the investment has a positive "net present value." See, e.g., Theodore S. Sims, Debt, Accelerated
Depreciation, and the Tale of a Teakettle: Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REV. 263 (1994). Even
investments that involve the expensing of durable asset costs do not produce positive returns in the first year, but
generate positive economics through subsequent returns. Id. at 281.
26

See infra text and notes at notes 90-97; infra Part IV.B. As noted there, the 2.5x limitation could itself be taken as
condoning overvaluation by comparison with cost.
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foundation for what we propose. There is ample precedent for such a limitation: it would be consistent with the income tax rules governing the disposition of property more generally; more to the
point, it is a limitation that Congress has seen fit to impose on other species of charitable
contributions that are viewed as particularly susceptible to abuse. In contrast with S. 2256, our
proposed limit on valuation would be applied irrespective of whether the easement is contributed by
an individual or via a pass-through entity. As suggested above (and as we document in Parts II and
III), non-syndicated easements are as prone as SCEs to overvaluation. Any serious effort to
eliminate conservation easement abuse must take cognizance of that reality. What constitutes "recently acquired" is necessarily arbitrary, but the three-year period in existing proposals seems
reasonable.27 After the expiration of three years, however, our proposed limit would not, as under
existing proposals, just expire; it would remain in place but be allowed to increase.28 What in
general we propose to show is that, given their almost unique potential for abuse of the appreciated
property rule, and, as reflected in recent decisions, the willingness of private actors to exploit that
potential to its limits, conservation easements bear a compelling similarity to other assets for which
Congress has acted to limit charitable contributions to basis. A comparable limitation is called for
here.
The final element of our proposal would take account of two striking aspects of conservation easements, features that distinguish them from most other tax-shelter investments. The first is
just how simple they are to construct: stripped to their essentials they consist of little more than
some undeveloped land, a suitably aggressive appraisal, and a story.29 The other is the immediacy
of their projected returns: the tax benefit from contributing an easement accrues entirely in the year
of contribution; in the case of an easement on newly-acquired property, that means in the taxable
year the investment is made.30 That combination of simplicity and immediacy creates powerful
temptations to invest.

To counter that temptation, we propose imposing an upfront cost on

27

In this respect our proposal is similar to Small's, see Small, Modest Proposal, supra note 16, at 1086, except that
our extended holding period is three years not eighteen months, and our limitation generally is to cost, whereas he
proposed limiting it to cost only where the claimed deduction exceeded cost by a factor of 2.5. In effect, our proposal
is tantamount to increasing to three years the long-term capital gain holding period, for purposes of determining the
amount deductible taking into account I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A), solely with respect to contributions of conservation
easements.
28

After three years we would adjust the allowable maximum value automatically at the rate of increase in housing
prices in the general vicinity of the property burdened by the easement. We would also allow for higher valuations
when justified and documented, not by speculative discounted cash flow valuations of property's "highest and best use,"
but only by reference to genuinely relevant comparable sales. See infra Part IV.C.2.
29

See infra Parts II and III.B.3.b.

30

See supra note 25. That immediacy is subject to and moderated by the percentage limitations on and carryover
provisions related to charitable contributions of I.R.C. § 170(b). Those limitations have been substantially liberalized
for contributions of conservation easements. See infra note 142.
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contributing an easement, in the form of a 5% fee levied on that portion of the contribution
attributable to unrealized appreciation. The fee could be structured so that it would only modestly
reduce the incentive to contribute a fairly valued conservation easement; at the same time, it would
be a deterrent to contributions found to have been substantially overvalued. By imposing that cost
at the threshold, rather than penalizing overvaluation only after the fact, the fee we propose would
have greater salience to prospective contributors, cautioning them to think carefully before investing
in what they have reason to think might be an overvalued conservation easement.
Congress has long been aware of the general susceptibility of the appreciated property rule
to abuse.31 It has acted to cabin that vulnerability primarily (but not entirely) with palliative administrative controls and valuation penalties levied only after the fact.32 But conservation easements are
so uniquely prone to manipulation, and to exploiting the appreciated property rule beyond any
reasonable limit, that those controls, even if supplemented by additional administrative requirements
such as those recently proposed by Burnett, Leshy and McLaughlin, will not prove adequate to the
task. Any serious effort to halt excessive valuation of conservation easements will require more
fundamental reform.
In Part II we outline the foundation for that claim. In Part III we explore in more detail the
background to and central nature of the problem, and its manifestation in some more recent
decisions; we also address in greater detail what we see as shortcomings in the differing administrative approaches advocated by Jordan & Longhofer and Judge Holmes. Part IV takes up more
generally the topic of reform. Parts IV.A-B address recently proposed solutions of a legislative
nature, including bills like S. 2256. Part IV.C returns to the role of the appreciated property rule,
and its implications for successful reform. We elaborate in Part IV.D on the proposals we offer in
lieu of other solutions. We believe that, if adopted, they would lead to a more effective and comprehensive solution to the problem of overvalued conservation easements, while leaving intact the
basic structure and incentives of the existing deduction, shorn of its vulnerability to widespread
overvaluation.
II.

A FRESH PERSPECTIVE
To put the matter into perspective we start with two Tax Court decisions, widely separated

in time, both involving charitable contributions of appreciated property, one having nothing else to
do with conservation easements. The latter concerned the doyenne of a distinguished corner of the
31

See generally Colinvaux, Broken System, supra note 8.

32

See infra Part III, at 18-19. Congress also enacted I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A), limiting contributions of ordinary
income property to basis, discussed infra in Part II, text and notes at notes 39, 44-47.
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mid-twentieth century world of modern and contemporary art in New York City, the Baroness Hilla
von Rebay, a close friend of and an advisor to Solomon R. Guggenheim. Her tax case, Rebay v.
Commissioner,33 involved the contribution of eight "non-objectivist" paintings, all of her own
creation, to three organizations described in I.R.C. § 170(c), for which she claimed charitable
contribution deductions totaling $169,000.
The other case involves one William Duane Horton, of Chattanooga, Tennessee, a "talented
entrepreneur" and real estate developer, who while out with his wife one day in 2007 "driving on a
country road about fifteen minutes outside Chattanooga in search of the perfect place for a new
home," came upon a 143 acre parcel of undeveloped land that while "significantly larger and
considerably more overgrown than what they wanted, . . . they thought . . . could be the diamond in
the rough for which they had been prospecting."34 Its value was something that (as found by the
Tax Court) Horton "was uniquely able to see." He "quickly contacted various investors to plan how
to buy and develop it." With them he organized Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC ("OLH"), through
which he purchased all 143 acres at the end of 2007 for $1.7 million. Horton's unique and evidently
instantaneous grasp of the extraordinary value of the parcel's potential was so perspicacious that in
little more than a year -- despite a contemporaneous 3% decline in local housing prices35 -- the
development rights to just 106 (less than three-quarters) of those 143 acres were claimed to have
mushroomed in value to $9.545 million, the amount that OLH sought to deduct when it contributed
a conservation easement restricting their development at the end of 2008.
To be sure, neither of the claimed deductions was ultimately allowed. The only then available evidence of the value of Mrs. Rebay's non-objectivist paintings was a single $15,000 sale,
apparently to an engineer who knew little about serious art but who had business dealings with Mrs.
Rebay's lawyer, evidence the Tax Court found unpersuasive; it allowed a total of $2,300 of the
$169,000 she had claimed.36

Mr. Horton's claimed deduction was likewise disallowed; not,

however, because it was "wildly inflated," but for failure to comply with one of those contestable
33

22 T.C.M. (CCH) 181 (1963). During the years at issue, 1955-59, Mrs. Rebay had adjusted gross incomes,
mostly from dividends, ranging from $135,000 to $159,000, sufficient for her to be taxed at the margin, if not at the
prevailing top 91% marginal rate, at least at 88% or 89%.
34

Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *3 (2020) (Holmes, J.). In a separate opinion
from which Judge Holmes alone dissented, the full Tax Court upheld the validity of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii),
governing the disposition of proceeds following judicial extinguishment of an easement, which OLH and Horton had
challenged. Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 154 T.C. 180 (2020). That decision was sustained on appeal in
Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 20-2117 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2022). The history of challenges to
the proceeds regulation is recounted infra, text and note at note 110.
35

See infra note 199.

36

Assessments of Hilla Rebay's painting underwent something of a rehabilitation some years following her death.
See Grace Glueck, Art Review, Guiding Spirit of the Guggenheim Was an Artist in Her Own Right, N.Y.TIMES, May
20, 2005, at E31.
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technical deficiencies of which Jordan & Longhofer and Judge Holmes alike have so little good to
say. Indeed, Judge Holmes was so persuaded that Horton's deduction -- of over 7.5 times the land's
year-earlier allocable acquisition cost37 -- was claimed entirely in good faith that he set aside the
government's assessment of negligence and overvaluation penalties.38
The issues raised by Mrs. Rebay's contributions were quelled a few years later in the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, when Congress legislated (in effect) to limit contributions of ordinary income
property like Mrs. Rebay's paintings to her basis.39 The current income tax environment does differ
in important ways from what prevailed during the mid-1950s, when Mrs. Rebay contributed her
paintings.

What is more, the comparison between Mrs. Rebay's paintings and Mr. Horton's

conservation easement is not exact. Nevertheless, their characteristics are sufficiently similar that
the comparison makes a powerful case for the proposition that, unless Congress acts with respect to
contributions of conservation easements, as it did fifty years ago with respect to contributions of
ordinary income property, to limit their deductions in some manner and in some measure to basis, it
will fail to halt the ongoing proliferation of conservation easement valuation abuse.
Efforts to curb conservation easement abuse that are confined to syndicated easements will
not be effective to deal with the problem. A glance at the facts and the Tax Court Memorandum
opinion in Oakbrook Land Holdings will suffice to highlight that conclusion. The typical SCE
against which the government has taken administrative action involves income tax deductions four
to five times the participants' investments in the syndication.40

In contrast, Duane Horton's

Oakbrook Land Holdings, whose contribution the court expressly noted was "not a syndicated
conservation easement,"41 laid claim to a "charitable" deduction more than 7.5 times the cost of the
(recently acquired) land over which the easement was granted.42 It (and cases like it)43 may differ in
37

The allocable cost of the 106 burdened acres was $1.7*106/143 = $1.26 million: $9.545/$1.26 = 7.575.

38

See infra note 145.

39

I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) reduces the
amount of any charitable contribution of property otherwise taken into account under this section . . .
by . . . (A) the amount of gain which would not have been long-term capital gain . . . if the property
contributed had been sold by the taxpayer at its fair market value (determined at the time of such
contribution).

Since a sale at fair market value would produce gain of FMV - AB, a deduction initially of fair market value, reduced
as provided in § 170(e)(1)(A), leaves a deduction of FMV - (FMV - AB) = AB. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
§ 170(e)(1) had applied only to gain taxed as ordinary income by reason of the "recapture" provisions of I.R.C. §§ 617,
1245 and 1250. The 1969 Act extended it to all gain not taxed as long-term capital gain, which included Mrs. Rebay's
paintings, which were non-capital assets in her hands. I.R.C. § 1221(3). It also reduced fair market value deductions in
some circumstances for assets with unrealized long-term capital gain. See infra notes 45 and 47.
40

See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 I.R.B. 544; SENATE BIPARTISAN REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.

41

Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *13 n.8 (2020).

42

See supra note 37.
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origin from the more mass-marketed SCEs, but it was no less (indeed, it was a good deal more)
aggressive. And it was made possible by exactly the same combination of elements -- the appreciated property rule and an inflated appraisal -- that have produced the deductions claimed by
purveyors of SCEs.
The difficulty of valuing, and the susceptibility to overvaluation of, non-fungible appreciated assets in cases like Hilla Rebay was an important aspect of Congress's decision fifty years
ago to broaden the scope of § 170(e).44 But there was more to it than that. At then-prevailing
marginal rates above 50%, the ability to deduct the fair market value of appreciated, ordinary income property -- even if fairly valued -- could leave a taxpayer better off by contributing than
selling it.45 To avoid the limitation of § 170(e)(1)(A), conservation easements are invariably contributed with respect to long-term capital gain property. As marginal rates on long-term capital
gains have always been well under 50%, the possibility of doing better by contributing than
selling a fairly valued easement has always been out of reach. Since, moreover, marginal rates
generally are now below 50%, that possibility no longer exists, even with respect to ordinary
income property. Despite that development § 170(e)(1)(A) continues to limit such contributions
to basis.46 What is more, Congress has acted to broaden the scope of § 170(e) by imposing comparable restrictions, even with respect to gain otherwise taxable as long-term capital gain, in other
situations viewed as having the potential for abuse.47 As conservation easements have come to
43

See infra Part III.B.3.

44

See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 55 (1969). The IRS in 1986 addressed the problem of valuation for artworks by
creating the Commissioner’s Art Advisory Panel, which provides advice and value recommendations regarding
taxpayer appraisals of tangible personal property in income, estate and gift tax returns. When a work is appraised at
$50,000 or more, the IRS examining agent or appeals officer must refer the case to the Art Appraisal Service, which
may in turn refer it to the Panel. The Panel members are gallery owners and directors and museum curators. See
The Art Advisory Panel of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Summary Report for Fiscal Year 2020,
Publication 5392 Dept. of Treasury Internal Revenue Service.
45

See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
77-78 (1970) [hereinafter 1969 ACT BLUEBOOK] (“As a result, in some cases it was possible for a taxpayer to
realize a greater after-tax profit by making a gift of appreciated property than by selling the property, paying the tax on
the gain, and keeping the proceeds.”); S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 80-81 (1969).
OF 1969

The extreme case is of zero-basis ordinary income property. At a 55% marginal rate the sale of $100 of such
property for $100 produces after-tax proceeds of $45; a $100 contribution, if allowed, produces after-tax proceeds of
$55. Hilla Rebay's paintings in her hands were non-capital assets, I.R.C. § 1221(3), with an adjusted basis of (or
approaching) $0. At her (roughly) 90% marginal rate during the years at issue a sale for $100 would have produced an
after-tax return of just $10; in contrast, each $100 contribution would have produced $90 after tax.
46

Some minor exceptions exist. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 170(e)(3)(B) (certain contributions of inventory), 170(e)(4)(A)
(contributions of scientific property used for research).
47

In 1969 Congress had been less concerned about, but not entirely indifferent to, the reduced but not non-existent
advantages of contributing preferentially taxed long-term capital gain. It curtailed some such contributions of tangible
personal property, and contributions generally of capital gain property to private foundations, but in a manner that took
account of that reduced advantage. See Halperin, Appreciated Property, supra note 8, at 1-2, 2 n.5. The limitation in
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exhibit a special proficiency at exploiting the appreciated property rule, on that ground alone they
merit being comparably curtailed.
The emergence of appraisal-based valuations that are increasingly far above actual fair
market value makes the case for reform qualitatively more compelling. It introduces, again, the
prospect of doing better in strictly financial terms by contributing a conservation easement than by
doing anything else with the property subject to the easement.

That, too, is evident from

Oakbrook Land Holdings, where the $9.545 million deduction for the restriction covering 106
acres, if it had been allowed, would (at a marginal rate of 35%)48 have immediately returned to
Mr. Horton and his investors over $3.3 million, nearly twice what they had just paid for the entire
143 acre tract of land. Using appraised valuations of development potential, taxpayers like Duane
Horton have been attempting through conservation easement contributions to exploit in an extreme
way the allowance of charitable deductions based on claimed "fair market" values, including
values attributable to unrealized appreciation; they are doing so to essentially the same extent that,
and to exactly the same effect as, contributions of ordinary income property exploited the
appreciated property rule in a world of high marginal rates before the adoption of § 170(e)(1)(A).
And that, in turn, points to the conclusion that the only effective way of curbing conservation
easement valuation abuse will be to tether the allowable deductions in some fashion or another to
basis.
We realize that, for much of the conservation community, this conclusion will be met with
hostility.

For the part of that community more conversant with conservation than taxation,

conservation easements are simply a valuable tool for conserving our national heritage. Tax litigation aside, they see them as remarkably free of institutional restrictions, and view what is being
conserved as presumptively worth the cost. But the values being protected -- their "conservation
values" -- are difficult to quantify, much less to equate to the costs of conserving them.49 The
the case of tangible personal property was motivated by concerns for valuation. Id. at 29 & nn.91-94; see also
Colinvaux, Broken System, supra note 8, at 273-74. When preferential taxation of long-term capital gain was restored
in 1991 following its repeal by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress left in place a complete reduction to basis of
those contributions of long-term capital gain property previously singled out for partial reduction in 1969. I.R.C. §
170(e)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
Since then Congress has expanded the categories of long-term capital gain property for which deductions are
limited to basis, most significantly to most categories of intellectual property. I.R.C. §§ 170(e)(1)(B)(iii)-(iv), 170(m)
(enacted in 2004).
48

In 2008 the top marginal rate was 39.6%.

49

Observers like Halperin, Better Way, supra note 1, at 311, question whether the benefits, either to the government
or to the public, from conservation easements are worth the revenue lost to the deductions, a concern expressed by the
Treasury in 1979. See Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 47-48. That very discrepancy has been acknowledged by
advocates for conservation easements, in arguing that proposed regulations requiring donee organizations to receive a
share of the proceeds when an easement was extinguished was ill-considered and should be withdrawn. The position of
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costs, in contrast, are both quantifiable and real. And since those costs are not being incurred by
the conservation community, they can afford to be unconcerned that the price being paid is inflated, or that the benefits of that inflation are accruing to those at the top of the income distribution
and least in need of government assistance, aid that is not merely unjustifiable but is being
illegitimately obtained.
Congress has blessed the use of this tool, but only on the premise that the easements are
being fairly valued. When land worth preserving has been held for some time, and with the passage of time has appreciated in value and come under developmental pressure, allowing a deduction for restricting development by contributing an easement may seem reasonable, even if the
deduction is allowed with respect to unrealized appreciation.50 We believe that in adopting §
170(h) that is basically what Congress had in mind.51
There is no reason to think, however, that Congress intended to legitimate an unlimited,
tax-implemented raid on the Treasury. But that is exactly what happens when a Duane Horton
purchases vacant rural land and almost immediately -- defined for present purposes as just a year
and a day later -- engages in what might most fairly and accurately be characterized as a "conservation easement flip." It can hardly have been accidental that Horton engaged as an appraiser an
individual known to be capable of producing conveniently bloated appraisals, based on realty's
"highest and best use." The appraiser was prepared to value the OLH easement at $19.5 million,
if that was what Horton and his colleagues had in mind; after a requested reconsideration he
trimmed it to a mere $9.545 million.52 But it defies credulity -- there is no nicer way of putting it
-- to view that $9.545 million appraisal as realistically capturing the value of development rights
that no one except for William Duane Horton was even remotely able to discern, with respect to a
tract of land that he managed to purchase shortly thereafter for under $1.3 million.53 OLH's
the New York Landmarks Conservancy, as characterized by Judge Holmes, was that the proposed regulation
improperly assumed that a conservation easement represented a positive economic value to donees because of
the possibility that donees might one day receive proceeds from extinguishment. . . . It argued that any such
assumption was "unrealistic" since "[t]he value of a conservation restriction to the donee organization is not a
monetary value but a philanthropic value as a device for achieving the charitable objectives of the
organization."
Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 154 T.C. 180, 236-37 (2020) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Even taken at face
value that observation does not explain why, if the original conservation objectives cease to be achievable and the
restriction is extinguished, the donee organization shouldn't receive back and reuse for conservation purposes whatever
the Federal government had previously paid for the restriction.
50

See Small, Modest Proposal, supra note 16, at 1088.

51

As contrasted with facade easements, which raise very different considerations, with which we do not deal here.

52

Oakbrook Land Holdings, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *8 n.3. See infra note 95 for further discussion of that
appraiser's role in valuing many of the easements at issue in the decisions discussed infra in Part III.B.3.
53

See supra note 37.
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claim to a $9.545 million deduction amounted to little more than an attempt at tax-induced,
appraisal-enabled theft. Any responsible tax lawyer understands full well that this is exactly what
is going on, even if, for whatever reason, they are among those who are unable to arrive at a
"judgment about the extent to which valuation of conservation easements represents a tax issue
that merits priority attention."54 Plainly it does. OLH's claimed deduction, and others like it, are
qualitatively indistinguishable from mass-marketed SCEs. They are decidedly not what Congress
had in mind when it enacted § 170(h).
In what follows we sketch briefly the exceptional nature of our system's basic treatment of
deductions for contributions of appreciated property. Equally briefly we sketch the ways in which
the allowance of deductions for contributing conservation easements differs from most other
charitable contributions. With respect to the former we emphasize the extent to which the fair
market value rule of Treasury Regulations § 1.170A-1(c)(2), however familiar it may be,
seriously departs from the way in which we treat virtually all other dispositions (voluntary or
otherwise) of appreciated property.55 With respect to the latter we emphasize (1) the pernicious
role of appraisals using speculative, discounted cash-flow ("DCF") analyses of developing
property to its so-called "highest and best use," leading to often demonstrably excessive easement
valuations, and (2) that excessive valuations are not by any means confined to "syndicated" conservation easements, but may be found in a substantial fraction of reported decisions involving
non-syndicated easements.
It is not sensible -- and more importantly will prove futile -- to try to curb conservation
easement abuse by partitioning the world into "bad" syndicated conservation easements and everything else, or by undertaking to litigate value in every case. What we should be trying to do
instead is distinguish legitimate conservation easements, over land with real conservation value
that has appreciated over time and that is truly under developmental pressure, from conservation
easement flips. Because the latter are what all the SCEs, and a substantial fraction of the other
litigated conservation easement decisions, have involved. And if one keeps an open mind about
tinkering with the appreciated property rule there is, as we have already suggested, a simple way
of accomplishing that. But the form of what has been proposed thus far will not do; at best it
54

It seems telling that a 9-person task force more than half of whom specialize in some aspect of tax or estate
planning managed to craft a 130-page formal report on one of the currently most controversial tax issues while uttering
the word "basis" just four times, two of which just quoted what is called for by Form 8283. ABA-RPTE Report, supra
note 12, at 336. The third reference lists donor basis as a suggested reporting requirement for a proposed Form 990
Schedule B-1. Id. at 328. The last of these references expressed the thought that the deduction for an easement contribution might be limited to basis if it was -- i.e., after it had been found to be -- overvalued by more than 35%. Id. at
335. At least that last reference implicitly acknowledges that the authors are cognizant of the fact that some charitable
contributions are indeed limited to basis.
55

Halperin, Appreciated Property, supra note 8; Colinvaux, Broken System, supra note 8.
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might kill SCEs, but it would do nothing to halt comparably aggressive individual easement
contributions, and it might have the perverse effect of legitimizing a host of other claimed
deductions that were less spectacularly but still indefensibly overvalued.56
III. CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
A. Charitable Contributions of Property
1. The Appreciated Property Rule
Deductions for charitable contributions of appreciated property57 are treated in a manner that
is exceptional among income tax-relevant transfers of property. The amount generally allowed as a
deduction is the property's "fair market value" at the time of contribution, defined in Treasury
Regulations § 1.170A-1(c)(2) as "the price at which the property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts."58
That treatment is so familiar an aspect of our tax system that it is easy to lose sight of just
how radically it departs from the way in which we generally treat dispositions of property: in almost
all other cases the amount allowed as a deduction (or otherwise subtracted in determining the tax
consequence) is limited to the taxpayer's adjusted basis.59 Where appreciated property is involved,
the fair market value rule of Treasury Regulations § 1.170A-1(c)(2) effectively permits deductions
56

See the discussion of HRH Investments, infra at Part III.B.3.c.

57

Charitable contributions of property other than money are almost invariably of appreciated property. With
property that has depreciated in value it is usually better to sell the property, claim any available loss deduction, and
contribute the proceeds instead.
58

See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). As to the participants’ assumed knowledge of the relevant facts, see infra note 97. See
generally MARGOT L. CRANDALL-HOLLICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R46178, THE CHARITABLE DEDUCTION FOR
INDIVIDUALS: A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (2020). A useful history of its origins and development will be found in
Colinvaux, Broken System, supra note 8, at 271-75. For substantive evaluations and criticism of the rule see, e.g.,
Halperin, Appreciated Property, supra note 8; Colinvaux, Broken System, supra note 8, at 318-24. In general the
treatment allowed by Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) is limited to gain on property that if sold would produce long-term
capital gain, and even then not always. See § 170(e)(1)(B); supra note 47; infra text and notes at notes 185-188.
Contributions of so-called "ordinary income" property are by I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) effectively limited to basis: the
contribution is reduced by the amount of gain that would not be taxed as long-term capital gain on sale. See Colinvaux,
Broken System, supra note 8, at 266-67, 279; text at note 39.
59

E.g., I.R.C. § 1001, allowing basis of property to be subtracted in measuring gain or loss on disposition; §§ 165,
166, limiting loss deductions generally to adjusted basis; Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7. So if property that had appreciated is
eventually disposed of at a loss, no deduction is allowed for the unrealized and previously untaxed appreciation.
Consequently, the amount deducted may not as a rule exceed what is tax-paid, i.e., basis.
Consistent with the limitation of contributions or ordinary income property to basis, contributions in kind of
personal services, which would produce ordinary income if performed for compensation, are not deductible. Treas.
Reg. § 1.170A-1(g). Disallowance produces about the same outcome as if the services had been monetized and the
proceeds then contributed to charity.
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for unrealized, untaxed appreciation without taxing the corresponding gain. In allowing a deduction
for pre-tax gain, rather than limiting it to what is tax-paid, the appreciated property rule is nearly
unique.
2. Valuation of Charitable Contributions
In ordinary circumstances adjusted basis is readily ascertainable. In contrast, at least in the
absence of an arm's-length exchange, fair market value often is not. For assets subject to regular
trading, market value is relatively easy to determine. But for less fungible property determining fair
market value is often difficult. Given the resulting uncertainty, the appreciated property rule creates
a natural temptation toward aggressive valuation of charitable contributions.60
Valuation has been more generally vexing for the income tax. Over the past forty years it
has elicited a series of penalty and reporting provisions intended to combat valuation abuse. Most
of them are framed in terms of overvaluation generally. But they have largely been enacted in response to aggressiveness in valuing charitable contributions, reflecting the vulnerability introduced
by the appreciated property rule. The first general penalty provision aimed specifically at overvaluation was § 6659, adopted with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Congress took note of
the magnitude of then pending valuation disputes, and the tendency of courts in such cases to "split
the difference" between taxpayers and the Service, resulting in an incentive to overvaluation.61 In
response, it adopted a bright-line penalty (with rates graduated from 10% to 30% based on the
extent of the overstatement) on underpayments of tax attributable to overstatements of claimed
valuations that exceeded the correct value by more than 150%.62
While § 6659 was phrased generally, charitable contributions were clearly on Congress's
mind when it adopted that provision.63 In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress returned to
the topic. It acknowledged the centrality of the appreciated property rule to valuation abuse of
charitable contributions, repeating an example of the contribution of an appreciated painting from
the 1981 Act's legislative history. It specifically

60

Colinvaux, Broken System, supra note 8, at 310.

61

That incentive was abetted by the fact that the then prevailing interest rate on deficiencies was less than prevailing market rates.
62

See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC
RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 332 ff. (1981) [hereinafter 1981 ACT BLUEBOOK].
63

The history to the 1981 Act illustrated the operation of new I.R.C. § 6659 with an example of a taxpayer contributing a painting and claiming a deduction of five times the painting's true value. See id. at 334. The history to the 1984
legislation addressing valuation of charitable contributions used the same example. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984
502 n.18 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 ACT BLUEBOOK].
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recognized that the tax benefits provided to taxpayers who contribute appreciated
capital-gain property to charities create opportunities for overvaluation because the
donor is entitled to deduct the fair market value of the property, but does not realize
capital gain equal to the appreciation. One way to reduce these opportunities to
overvalue would be to eliminate the advantage that charitable gifts of appreciated
property have over gifts of cash. The Congress understood, however, that many
charitable organizations depend on this tax benefit for fund-raising and as a means of
acquiring valuable property.64
Aware that the Service had successfully challenged some instances of overvaluation, Congress nevertheless acknowledged the impossibility of detecting all or even most of them through
audit, and took note of the corrosive effect on compliance of the "widespread publicity given to the
extent of gross overvaluations by some donors."65

Consequently, while continuing to allow

deductions based on fair market value, Congress addressed the problem of overvaluation with the
imposition of new substantiation and disclosure requirements, and by stiffening the then applicable
penalties. It required donors to obtain (and in some cases submit) qualified appraisals for contributions in excess of statutorily prescribed thresholds.66 As a further check on overvaluation, it required reporting by charitable recipients that disposed of contributed property (other than publicly traded
securities) with a claimed value of more than $5,000 within two (later extended to three) years
following receipt.67 Finally, solely with respect to overvalued charitable contributions, Congress
increased the penalty rate of recently adopted § 6659 to a flat 30%, and curtailed the IRS's freedom
to waive the penalty.
Congress adopted these reforms in the hope that they would suffice to curtail valuation
abuse of charitable contributions. The legislative history reflects that Treasury was skeptical, and
that Congress itself was not oblivious to the possibility that the Treasury might be right:
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See id. at 504.
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The new requirements denied a deduction for a claimed charitable gift of property valued at more than $500
unless the return included a description of the property; for a deduction of more than $5,000, it required the taxpayer to
obtain a qualified appraisal, and to include a summary of the appraisal with the return (I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)), subject to
an exception for gifts of publicly-traded securities (I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(I)). If the claimed deduction exceeds
$500,000 the taxpayer must attach the appraisal itself (I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(D)). The associated regulations (Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-13(c)) prescribe the information to be reported, which is required by statute to include both the acquisition
date and the cost or other basis of the contributed property. Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98369, § 155(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 691 (1984); see generally Loube v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2020-3 at *15 (2020).
Congress also prescribed requirements for appraisals and appraisers, I.R.C. § 170(f)(11), elaborated on in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-17.
67

See I.R.C. § 6050L(a)(1). The charity must (among other things) describe the property, report the date of and the
amount received on disposition, and report the name, address and TIN of the donor. Cf. RERI Holdings I, LLC v.
Comm'r, 149 T.C. 1 (2017) aff'd sub nom. Blau v. Comm'r, 924 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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The Congress understands that the Treasury Department remains concerned whether
the substantiation and penalty provisions of the Act will prove sufficient to preclude
taxpayers from overvaluing charitable donations of property in all circumstances.
This concern relates principally to tax shelter promotions that exploit the
deductibility of appreciation in capital gain assets.
. . . . The Congress expects the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service to monitor the
effectiveness of the new provisions and to notify the tax-writing committees if there
are any continuing valuation concerns that should be addressed by further
legislation.68
Congressional expectations did not, however, reckon with the possibilities latent in the allowance of
deductions for conservation easements, which it had adopted in permanent form just four years
before. In retrospect, moreover, the materialization of those possibilities does not seem to have
been deterred by the fact that, in 1989, Congress revised the overvaluation penalties both to simplify
and to make them more uniform and more stringent.69
B.

Conservation Easements
1. Valuation

The development of §§ 170(f)(3) and (h), from their origins in the legislative history to the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 to their permanent adoption in the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980,
has been chronicled elsewhere.70 They took their permanent form as the third of three exceptions -the others being remainder interests in a personal residence or farm, and undivided fractional interests in property -- to the general prohibition against the allowance of deductions for contributions
not in trust of so-called "partial interests" in property.71
Conservation restrictions differ in important respects from the other exceptions to the partial
interest rule. A remainder interest in real property will eventually become possessory, thereby
ensuring that at some point the donee will succeed to its entire fair market value. As to undivided
interests in tangible personal property, of which what has most commonly been controversial is art,
the statute requires that the donee succeed to possession of the entire interest in the contributed
68
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Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721, 103 Stat. 2106, 2395-99 (1989). It repealed
§ 6659 and adopted what is now § 6662, which generally imposes an "Accuracy-Related Penalty on Underpayments"
of tax. Sections 6662(a) and (e) impose a 20% penalty on underpayments of income tax attributable to a "substantial
valuation misstatement," defined as one in excess of 150% of what is determined to be the "correct" amount; § 6662(h)
increases the penalty to 40% in the case of a "gross valuation misstatement," one in excess of 200% of the correct
amount. I.R.C. § 6695A, added in 2006, applies to an appraiser whose appraisal results in a substantial or gross
valuation misstatement. McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 303-05.
70
The history leading to the permanent adoption in 1980 is recounted, among other places, in Sims, Recollections,
supra note 1, at 44-45.
71

See id.
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property in a finite period of time.72 In most such instances, then, the donee will eventually be in a
position to benefit from and even to sell the underlying property itself. Conservation easements, in
contrast, "take the form of a limitation, held by a charitable recipient, on the use that someone else
(the fee owner) may make of the encumbered property."73 They are perpetual restrictions that never
become possessory, and by their very nature do not change hands in arm's-length transactions.
There is no market in which they might be valued,74 and so their value must be determined by
appraisal.
The valuation of both contributed remainder interests in realty and contributed fractional
interests in property also involve appraisal. But in either instance the required appraisal is generally
of the fair market value, determined at the time of contribution under Treasury Regulations
§ 1.170A-1(c)(2), of the entire (in principle, alienable) property the interest in which is being
contributed. As far as we are aware such appraisals are not systematically problematic.75
With conservation easements, in contrast, what must be valued is not some underlying item
of transferable property, but the otherwise non-transferable intangible interest being conferred on
the charitable recipient. Valuing that interest, using so-called "before and after" valuation, requires
not one but two appraisals,76 the first of the property before imposition of the conservation restriction, the second as burdened by the restriction. The need for multiple appraisals is infrequently
required elsewhere in the law,77 and is a principal source of both the difficulty and the controversy
in valuing conservation easements.
72

I.R.C. § 170(o) requires, among other things, that the donor contribute all remaining interests in the property by
the earlier of ten years following the contribution or her death; the donee must have enjoyed substantial physical possession in the interim, or the deduction is subject to recapture; the statute also caps the amount of subsequent fractional
gifts at the lesser of fair market value at the time of the initial contribution or the subsequent contributions.
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See Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 47.
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E.g., ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12, at 331. Some government programs do purchase conservation
restrictions, including in California (see Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 43 & note 9) and within the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. BLM, supra note 19, at 8. Such programs seem to be relatively few, and it is not clear to
what extent (if any) the purchased easements are subsequently traded. Contributed easements do not seem to be traded;
the only transferee to whom they might be of value is the fee holder, who is by their perpetual nature prohibited from
acquiring them, except in the event of judicial extinguishment. The provision of the regulations governing
extinguishment is discussed infra at note 110.
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One conspicuous exception is the valuation of art, a problem that has been addressed with the IRS's Art Advisory
Panel. See supra note 44.
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E.g., McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 232-37; Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 50-53;
ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12, at 331-34; Losch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 914 (1988); Starkman, supra
note 3, at 1476.
77

Before and after valuation is prescribed by Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7 for determining the amount of a casualty loss,
although in such instances the before value is typically of the property as it actually existed before the damage was
sustained, not of some hypothesized, speculative future use. Outside of taxation it has been used in eminent domain
proceedings. E.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934), which involved the determination of just compensation
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When Congress was deliberating making § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii) permanent, the Treasury expressed concern about that aspect of the legislation in particular. Its concern was focused primarily
on the determination of "after" valuations; it thought that "before" valuations would typically be the
property's current fair market value, unburdened by the contemplated restriction, and was concerned
that the after valuation would end up being inherently speculative.78 If what eventually materialized
had been as the Treasury apprehended the resulting deductions for conservation easements would
have been a matter of some concern but little more. In that event each individual deduction would
in the worst case be capped at the property's pre-restriction, unburdened fair market value. But the
Treasury's prognostication was misplaced, and it turns out optimistically so. As matters have
developed the most problematic valuation controversies have involved before valuations, based on
appraisals that range from aggressively speculative to fancifully imaginative estimates of the
unburdened property's "highest and best use."
2. Highest and Best Use Valuation
Echoing language in the Senate Report on the 1980 legislation, the regulations expressly
sanction consideration of the probable use of property to be burdened by a conservation restriction
in valuing the restriction. They provide that
the fair market value of the property before contribution of the conservation restriction must take into account not only the current use of the property but also an
objective assessment of how immediate or remote the likelihood is that the property,
absent the restriction, would in fact be developed, as well as any effect from zoning,
conservation, or historic preservation laws that already restrict the property's
potential highest and best use.79
As noted elsewhere the intended import of that language is less than entirely clear.80 While on its
surface it appears to sanction pre-restriction valuation taking account of property's highest and best
use, it simultaneously pushes back against expansive "highest and best use" valuation, noting that
the prospects for development might be "remote," or that value might already be "restricted" by
other land use regulations.81 Whatever the exact import of the Senate Finance Committee Report, or
for takings resulting from damming an outlet to the Lake of the Woods in Minnesota (as well as in Ontario and
Manitoba), thereby raising the water level and submerging parts of some landowners' land. See also Miss. & Rum
River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878). See infra text at notes 85 and 97.
78

Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 51 n.44.
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Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii); compare S. COMM. ON FIN., TAX TREATMENT EXTENSION ACT OF 1980, 96TH
CONG., S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 15 (1980).
80

Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 52-53. As Sims notes, "the Committee Report language could be seen more
as cautioning against, than as expressly condoning, speculative highest and best use valuations of conservation restrictions." Id.
81

See Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 52 n.54; see also Minor Tax Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
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of the corresponding provision of the regulations, it has become increasingly clear, especially over
the past fifteen years, that "highest and best use" before valuations are at the heart of the most
serious valuation abuse.82 And, in contrast with the Treasury's expressed concern with speculative
"after" valuations, there is no theoretical ceiling on the amount of a deduction that can be claimed
where aggressive "before" valuations are concerned. If recent case law and commentary are a
guide, it is now commonplace in conservation easement cases to find highest and best use valuation
invoked where it is clearly out of place, producing overvaluation that is both systematic and egregious.83 That is most conspicuous in cases involving restrictions on property for which there is a
recent arm's-length price, despite which the property's "highest and best use" is deployed to produce
an appraised value claimed to justify a dramatically higher deduction.84
It is true that different economic actors, bringing differing skills, aspirations, and tolerances
for risk to the endeavor, can put the same piece of realty to different uses, leading to significantly
Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 167 (1980) (statement of Daniel Halperin).
See, for example, Mountanos v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818 (2013) (Part II.A, text preceding note 3), aff'd 651 F.
Appx. 592 (9th Cir. 2016):
The highest and best use of property can be any realistic, objective potential use of the property. . . . .
[It] is presumed to be the use to which the land is currently being put absent proof to the contrary. . . .
A proposed highest and best use different from the property's current use requires the taxpayer to
demonstrate "closeness in time" and "reasonable probability" of the proposed use. (Citations
omitted.)
See also Losch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 914-15 (1988). Mountanos involved an 880-acre ranch in California, used for recreation, subject to a contract pursuant to California's Williamson Act that conferred favorable property
tax treatment in return for restricting development to agricultural use. In 2005 the taxpayer nevertheless granted an
easement to a local land conservancy and claimed a charitable contribution with an appraised value of $4.7 million,
premised on residential or vineyard development as the highest and best uses of the land. The court noted that “We
consider existing zoning, historic preservation and other laws and restrictions at the time contributed as well as
economic feasibility in evaluating whether a proposed use was reasonably probable and likely in the near future.”
Mountanos, T.C. Memo. 2013-138, at *8.
The court found insufficient evidence of access, water supplies, or demand to render vineyard use "reasonably
probable"; given the Williamson Act restrictions it concluded that residential development was not a "probable use . . .
in the near future." It ultimately found the highest and best "before" use of the ranch, recreation, to be identical to its
use thereafter; treated the "correct" value of the contributed easement to be $0; and sustained imposition of gross
overvaluation penalties based on all but $100,000 of the $4.7 million deduction claimed. Id. at *19.
That same ranch was listed for sale, ten years later, in May 2015, for $1.15 million; the listing broker (John
Lazaro) was one of the taxpayer's valuation experts in the Tax Court proceeding. It sold on September 18, 2018, for the
asking price. ESTATELY, https://www.estately.com/listings/info/7181-scotts-valley-road--2 (last visited February 6,
2022). Even taking account of the 9% decline (see infra note 199) in Lake County housing values from 2005 to 2018,
and on that account hypothesizing a $1.15/0.91  $1.25 million market value in 2005, the eventual sales price suggests
that the $4.7 million valuation claimed in 2005 was elevated by a factor of about 4.
82
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E.g., id.; Starkman, supra note 3, at 65-70.
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See supra text at notes 52-54; infra text at notes 89-97.
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different outcomes with different valuations.85 But the notion that such differing possibilities
(together with the differing expenditures of effort and resources to effectuate them, subject to
differing risks) somehow systematically fail to be reflected in a roughly contemporaneous arm'slength transfer price determined in a reasonably functioning market is inconsistent with our beliefs
about the operation of markets.86
The standard conceptualization of "fair market value," in the income tax and elsewhere,
reflects the fundamental belief that the parties to an exchange are reasonably well informed and at
liberty to proceed or not; neither the "willing buyer" nor the "willing seller" of the regulatory
definition is assumed to be "under any compulsion to buy or sell," and both are assumed to have
"reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." As one court put it, in the context of valuing a facade
easement, it is
a basic tenet of the fair market value paradigm . . . that, with respect to both the
hypothetical buyer and the hypothetical seller, "each is a rational economic actor,
that is, each seeks to maximize his advantage in the context of the market that exists
at the date of valuation."87
One-half of that equation is that in agreeing to an exchange the seller is seeking to obtain a
price that reflects the maximum value that she reasonably believes might ultimately be extracted
from her property. She might not get the most that she ideally would like; her estimate of the maximum value may differ from (be less than) that of the purchaser; the assessments of the prospective
seller and buyer might be influenced by differences in their respective tolerances for risk. But in
positing that both buyer and seller are reasonably informed, and under no compulsion to proceed -85

See, e.g., Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1352 (2020) (where the court opined that
taxpayer’s experience in development made him “uniquely able to see” the potential of the land at issue). The Supreme
Court long ago observed in affirming a condemnation award that
[p]roperty is not to be deemed worthless because the owner allows it to go to waste, or . . . because
he is unable to put it to any use. Others may be able to use it, and make it subserve the necessities or
conveniences of life. Its capability of being made thus available gives it a market value which can be
readily estimated.
Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1878); see also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246
(1934).
86

See Ellis, supra note 14; Ramsay, supra note 14; Small et al., supra note 14. Market "efficiency" is most commonly associated with securities markets, especially those with active, competitive trading by well-informed actors.
See, e.g., JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 308 (5th ed. 2020) ("The idea that competition
among investors works to eliminate all positive-[Net Present Value] trading opportunities is referred to as the efficient
markets hypothesis. It implies that securities will be fairly priced, based on their future cash flows, given all
information that is available to investors.").
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Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. P'ship v. Comm'r, 139 T.C. 304, 336 (2012) (quoting Estate of Jameson v. Comm'r, 267
F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir. 2001)). The same notion appears in decisions involving valuation for purposes of
condemnation. E.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934); see infra note 97.
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so that up until the point of agreement the seller remains free to search for a higher bidder -- it is fair
to infer that the price on which the parties settle fairly represents the true worth of the land, valued at
its highest, reasonably foreseeable, practicably achievable use.88

It reflects, in other words,

valuation at that moment premised on the property's highest and best use. That premise is certainly
consistent with the language of Treasury Regulations § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii).
Despite this, the deductions at issue in an increasing number of recent opinions reflect
claimed "before" valuations based on highest and best use that are many multiples of the property's
cost, even as reflected in a relatively recent arm's-length transaction. Given the temporal proximity
of those transactions to the corresponding contributions, such claims carry the remarkable implication that the value of development rights captured by highest and best use valuation can somehow
exceed the value of the unburdened land.89
As outlandish as that seems it has been provided with intellectual cover by observers who
otherwise profess to be sympathetic to eliminating conservation easement abuse. As noted in the
introduction, Jordan & Longhofer have criticized the IRS's litigation strategy as misguidedly focusing on technical shortcomings in easement documents, typically involving the requirement that a
conservation easement provide protection "in perpetuity," thereby invalidating "legitimate" contributions, while shying away from addressing the difficult problem of valuation.90 They urge the
Service to focus instead on attacking syndicated conservation easements by challenging as "shams"
the vehicles taxed as partnerships through which the tax benefits are syndicated.91 In so doing they
acknowledge that the easement valuations typically claimed by SCEs do not meet the standards
articulated in court decisions92 and the § 170 regulations for what constitutes "reasonably probable"
prospects for developing property to its highest and best use.93
At the same time, Jordan & Longhofer are explicit in ascribing such overvaluations to an
"appraisal quirk," namely that the "potential profit associated with" developing property to its
highest and best use may in some instances "far exceed the value of the underlying land," with the
consequence "that the easement value can exceed the value of the" land. It is to the perversion of
this "quirk" using "sham" organizations -- not the quirk itself, which they appear to view as
otherwise legitimate -- that they ascribe the valuation abuses found in SCEs. They illustrate that
88

See, e.g., Mountanos v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2013-138, at *6-7 (2013), aff'd 651 F. App'x. 592 (9th Cir. 2016);
Losch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909 (1988); see also infra text and note at notes 111-113.
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See id. at 1261.
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claim with an example that deserves to be quoted at length. It is based on the Bothwell Ranch, a
fourteen-acre parcel containing one of the last orange groves remaining in the San Fernando Valley,
listed for sale at $13.9 million, even though it was
already zoned to permit residential development, could be divided into 26 half-acre
lots; nearby homes advertised as "competitive resales" sold for an average price of
$2.8 million. If the advertised comparable homes represented reasonably probable
redevelopment of the orange grove, the potential value of Bothwell Ranch could
easily exceed $70 million if it were converted into a residential development.
. . . [I]f the owners of the ranch . . . placed a conservation easement on the grove, the
HBU of luxury residential development should guarantee them a deduction equal to
the sales price of those homes less any associated development costs.94
There are important shortcomings, both with Jordan & Longhofer's example and with the
more general inference they extract from it. The problem with the example itself is its tacit assumption that those "associated development costs" would represent some trivial fraction of the sales
price of the homes, leading them to equate the development value foregone, and hence the value of
a contributed easement, with the sum of the (presumed) prices of the completed homes, ignoring the
time, effort, and expense of turning fourteen acres of orange grove into twenty-six completed
houses ready for sale. Equating those two values captures exactly the sort of indifference to the
rudiments of DCF analysis that has helped fuel the recent proliferation of inflated highest and best
use valuations.95 On any number of plausible assumptions about those variables (to say nothing of
the risks involved), that $70 million highest and best use valuation could easily turn into something
with a present value less than one-fifth that amount, less, not more, than the price for which
Bothwell Ranch was apparently being offered for sale.96
94

See id. at 1262 n.26 (emphasis added). Their claim elicited a brief but scathing reply by Ellis, supra note 14, with
which we agree, although the matter is not, as Ellis's title might suggest, confined to SCEs.
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A handful of appraisers appear to be regularly involved in valuing conservation easements, including David
Roberts (now deceased), who played a role in many of the decisions surveyed in Part III.B.3, and Claud Clark, III,
against whom (among others) the Justice Department brought suit "to prevent him from issuing future appraisals involving syndicated conservation easements." SENATE BIPARTISAN REPORT, supra note 6, at 53; see United States v.
Zak, 426 F.Supp.3d 1365 (N.D. Ga 2019). In a proceeding by the Alabama Real Estate Appraisers Board to revoke
Clark's license, which he voluntarily surrendered, an expert retained by the Board testified in detail to the sorts of
considerations that Clark routinely ignored in producing inflated discounted cash flow-based appraisals, and that Jordan
& Longhofer may well have overlooked -- or at least swept under the rug with the trivializing phrase "less any
associated development costs" -- in postulating that the development value of Bothwell Ranch might be close to $70
million, evidently about 26 times the average nearby "competitive resale" price of $2.8 million. See SENATE
BIPARTISAN REPORT, supra note 6, at 54-56; cf. McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 238-39.
96

See Jordan & Longhofer, supra note 10, at 1262 n.26. To begin with, even at $13.9 million, the land cost alone
for each house would be on the order of $600,000, and that's before adding in costs of development in terms of design,
permitting, and provisioning utilities and roads; the cost of labor and materials in construction; the costs of marketing
and sale; and time. One way of getting a back-of-the-envelope hand on the aggregate of those costs (other than time) is
to assume some net profit-margin to the developer on each house, and to supplement it with assumptions about time to
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Numerical details aside, the more important point is just how preposterous it is to assume
that the development rights to a parcel of realty could ever legitimately be worth more than the unburdened land. Whenever a piece of property exhibited that characteristic -- the sum of its parts
being worth more than the whole -- someone would surely step in and purchase the fee in the land
so as to profit by selling the (ex hypothesis more valuable) development rights. Just imagining that
state of affairs leads to a recognition that any such discrepancy in value would quickly be bid away,
with the underlying land being revalued to not less than the value of the development rights.97
complete the first of the 26 houses and to complete the sale of the last one. Using what strike us as optimistic
assumptions -- that it took two years from acquisition to have the first house ready for sale, that all 26 could be sold by
the end of the ensuing two years, that the developer's net profit margin was 25%, and using a discount rate of 10% -the present value of the profits from developing the houses would be about $13,050,000. Just increasing the number of
years to complete and sell all the houses from two to three, or to four, reduces the present value to about $12,450,000
and $11,900,000, respectively. Preserving the assumption of all houses completed and sold by four years after land
acquisition but increasing the discount rate to 15% produces a present value of $11,400,000. By comparison with our
assumptions, the court in Trout Ranch, in arriving at highest and best use valuations for a subdivision in Gunnison
County, Colorado, assumed a profit margin of 15% of gross revenues. Trout Ranch, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
2010-283, at *3 (2010). Since these estimates are linear functions of profit margin, using 15% would reduce each of
them by 40%, all to less than $8 million. Calculations are the authors’, and are available on request. They assume that
net revenues are realized at the end of each year of sales. Increasing the revenue frequency from annually to monthly
increases the baseline $13,050,000 estimate to just over $13,580,000.
97

Courts confronted with implausible appraised assessments of developmental values have not been indifferent to
that reality, especially when there has been a roughly contemporaneous arm’s-length sale. See, in particular, the bench
opinion in the Tax Court proceeding in PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Comm’r, No. 26096-14, https://dawson.ustaxcourt.gov/case-detail/26096-14 (T.C. Sept. 9, 2016). See also, e.g., Hughes v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-94, at *24 (2009)
("After all, the best evidence of fair market value is a recent sale of the property at issue"); Mountanos v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 2013-138, at *6-8 (2013), aff'd 651 F. App'x. 592 (9th Cir. 2016).
An alternative, "asymmetric information" story has recently been put forward in support of the claim, at least
in the context of facade easements. Jacob Dean & Megan Glosser, Just a Facade? Analyzing Historic Preservation
Easement Issues, 174 TAX NOTES FEDERAL 1083 (2022). Dean & Glosser's case for the plausibility of disparities between a recent purchase price and fair market value rests on two moves. The first is a strained gloss on Olson v. United
States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934), which they take as standing for the general proposition that "cost" bears no necessary
relationship to "fair market value." They observe (at 1085, footnote omitted, emphasis added) that the Court in Olson
importantly, decoupled the FMV of the property from the owner's purchase price. The Court stated
that the FMV "may be more or less than the owner's investment. He may have acquired the property
for less than its worth, or he may have paid a speculative and exorbitant price. Its value may have
changed substantially while held by him."
To this (at 1088) they later add that “[i]t is generally easier . . . to understand . . . a disparity between purchase price and
FMV when a substantial period of time elapses . . . . But that is not required, as the Supreme Court noted in Olson and
the previous examples illustrate.”
The problem is that Olson (see supra note 77) involved condemnation of shoreland bordering Lake of the
Clouds that appeared to have been of long-standing tenure, and nothing in the opinion countenances a generalized
"decoupling" of cost from market value, even where there has been a recent arm's-length exchange. Indeed, in a passage that could easily describe conservation easements, in that there were no market transactions in the "flowage easements" at issue in Olson, the Court invokes value as the outcome of "fair negotiations between an owner willing to sell
and a purchaser desiring to buy," adding that "there should be taken into account all considerations that fairly might be
brought forward and reasonably be given substantial weight in such bargaining." 292 U.S. at 257. The implicit
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A number of courts have nevertheless been recently confronted with charitable contributions
based on inflated DCF-based valuations that were at odds with prices observed in contemporaneous
arm's-length sales. Most of them have sensibly pushed back. One of the first to do so with real
clarity, however, did not involve a conservation easement, but an even more brazen episode
involving a contributed remainder interest in developed property subject to a long-term lease. The
taxpayer in RERI Holdings,98 an LLC owned by (among others) the owner of the Miami Dolphins,
Stephen Ross, had purchased a remainder interest in a 288,000 square foot building that was rented
to a web hosting facility under a long-term lease and had recently been sold for $42 million. The
remainder interest, deferred for some twenty years, was acquired for about $3 million by Ross's
LLC, RERI Holdings.

About eighteen months later, RERI contributed the remainder to the

University of Michigan, of which Ross was a major benefactor, and claimed a $33 million charitable deduction based on an aggressive DCF valuation of the residual rentals following expiration of
the lease. As required by the terms of the contribution, U of M held the remainder for a little over
two years99 and then resold it for under $2 million.100
The description above is a barebones abstraction, but it is faithful to the financial outlines of
the case. The entire proceeding produced two lengthy preliminary opinions denying motions for
assumption, as in Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2), is of symmetric information. Dean & Glosser’s next move involves the
example to which they principally refer, Example 7 of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(4): that example assumes a highest
and best use value of an otherwise developable 200-acre estate (containing an historic house) that is $175,000 more
than its value as foreclosed from development by an easement. Dean & Glosser observe (at 1086) that "any mention of
purchase price or [the owner's] basis" is "[c]onspicuously absent from this example." But what is just as conspicuously
missing is any reference to when the owner acquired the estate; the example does not speak one way or another to the
possible relevance of a recent arm's-length sale.
The real estate firm by which Dean & Glosser are employed, which appears to specialize in historic
rehabilitation, recently filed suit to invalidate Notice 2017-10, which includes a ratio of deductions to investment
greater than 2.5-1 among its criteria for classifying an easement contribution as a listed transaction. See GBX
Associates LLC v. United States, No. 1:2022cv00401 (N.D. Ohio filed Mar. 11, 2022).
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RERI Holdings, I, LLC v. Comm'r, 149 T.C. 1 (2017), aff'd sub nom Blau v. Comm'r, 924 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir
2019). Prior to trial and the resulting Tax Court opinion, RERI was the subject of two earlier decisions denying
successive motions for partial summary judgment, first by the taxpayer, RERI Holdings, I, LLC v. Comm'r, 107 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1488 (2014), and then by the government, RERI Holdings, I, LLC v. Comm'r, 143 T.C. 41 (2014).
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The holding period presumably was imposed to avoid the under two-year reporting obligation then required by
I.R.C. § 6050L, which was extended to three years by the Pension Protection Act of 2006.
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As if that weren't enough, Mr. Ross's first act had an equally notable encore: in denying RERI's initial motion for
summary judgment, the court laconically noted (T.C. Memo. 2014-99, at*8) that on
December 3, 2005, after the expiration of the required two-year holding period, the University sold
the SMI for $1,940,000 to HRK Real Estate Holdings, LLC (HRK), a Delaware LLC indirectly
owned by petitioner and an associate. HRK had pre-sold the SMI to a third-party individual for $3
million on or about December 20, 2005. On December 26, 2005, that third party donated the SMI to
another charitable organization and claimed a charitable contribution deduction of $29,930,000 in
connection therewith, . . . .
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partial summary judgment, followed by a four-day trial, much of it devoted to valuation, and culminated in a forty-five-page opinion on the merits. After sifting through the sea of technical detail
in which this was all submerged, the Tax Court disallowed the deduction in its entirety and sustained the imposition of gross overvaluation penalties. At the end of all this the Court found the value
of the remainder to be worth about $3.463 million when contributed, about 17% more than RERI
had paid for it eighteen months before.101

Both the disallowance of the deduction and the

imposition of penalties were sustained on appeal.
The case was resolved on grounds that are of immediate relevance to decisions involving
conservation easements. Having purchased the remainder for about $3 million and claiming a deduction of $33 million, RERI elected not to report its basis in the contributed interest, as required by
Treasury Regulations § 1.170A-13(c)(4)(i) and reflected on Form 8283. That omission caused the
deduction to be disallowed. Since that same deficiency has shown up in a number of recent conservation easement cases, and speaks directly to both the sort of valuation argument advanced by
Jordan & Longhofer and the valuations claimed in such cases, the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Blau,
upholding the Tax Court's decision, merits quoting at length:
RERI first argues that the taxpayer's basis in a donated property is not necessary to
evaluate the taxpayer's charitable contribution because the deductible amount is the
fair market value (FMV) of the property, and the basis is not an input in calculating
the fair market value. But RERI fails to recognize that the purpose of the
substantiation requirements is not merely to collect the information necessary to
compute the value of donated property. The requirements have the broader purposes
of assisting the IRS in detecting and deterring inflated valuations. Because the cost
or other basis in property typically corresponds with its FMV at the time the
taxpayer acquired it, an unusually large difference between the claimed deduction
and the basis alerts the IRS to a potential over-valuation, particularly if the
acquisition date, which must also be reported, is not much earlier than the date of
the donation. . . . Though the Congress left it to the discretion of the Secretary of the
Treasury to impose additional reporting requirements, the Congress specifically
identified the basis and the date of acquisition as the bare minimum that a taxpayer
must provide. We should be very reluctant to set to naught what the Congress
deemed essential.102
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Much of the opinion was devoted to an analysis of extensive testimony by four experts bearing on valuation, all
of it involving discounted cash flow analyses of the same general sort used to support easement valuations based on the
underlying property's pre-contribution highest and best use. E.g., 149 T.C. at 7-13. The value found by the court on
the date of contribution, discounted at an annual rate of 12%, was equivalent in present value to what RERI had paid
for the interest 18 months earlier.
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Blau, 924 F.3d at 1269-70 (emphasis added). The substantiation was mandated by the Deficit Reduction Act
(DEFRA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 155(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 691 (1984). See supra note 66.
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The RERI litigation underscores the importance in general of the DEFRA-mandated disclosure by donors of both acquisition date and cost of contributed property, as well as the potential
fatality of failing to disclose that information. More importantly, the Court of Appeals language in
Blau, and the Tax Court's factual findings on valuation in RERI, both lean heavily against the claim
that the market value of subsidiary interests in realty can somehow exceed (much less substantially)
the price at which the realty itself recently changed hands, which is precisely what highest and best
use valuation has repeatedly been deployed to maintain.103 It is a conclusion that applies with equal
force to syndicated and non-syndicated easements alike.
3. Conservation Easement Decisions
The growing body of conservation easement decisions has been canvassed both extensively
and intensively by others.104 The reported decisions reflect the prevalence of aggressive valuation
that extends beyond the mass-marketed SCEs, detailed in the Senate Bipartisan Report, that have
occupied so much recent attention. Professor McLaughlin's 2016 study,105 buttressed by Oakbrook
Land Holdings, suffices to establish that. But there have been more reported decisions than just
OLH since 2016. We sample them briefly here, primarily to highlight the shortcomings of solutions
that have been proposed to date. One implication is that litigating value case by case will not in any
remotely efficient way weed out the "wildly inflated" deductions that are widely associated with
SCEs from the (presumptively) legitimate everything else; everything else has its own share of
overvalued conservation easements, and attempting to deal with the problem by litigating value in
each of them will be untenably resource intensive.106 Another is that even the world of SCEs is
more complex than the conservation easement flips depicted in the Senate Bipartisan Report.
Addressing overvaluation with a strategy that focuses narrowly on those consisting of just a piece of
real estate and an appraisal lodged inside a pass-through entity, or that limits deductions to some
arbitrarily fixed multiple of the investments in such an entity, will leave a great number of overvalued easements untouched.

103

Although RERI did not involve an easement, the taxpayer's appraiser sought to justify the claimed $33 million
valuation with the same sort of discounted cash flow analysis used to produce inflated, highest and best use valuations
of conservation easements, and in Jordan & Longhofer's effort to justify valuing Bothwell Ranch using the $70 million
aggregate sales prices of the hypothetical 26-house development. See supra text and notes at notes 93-94. Compare
RERI Holdings I, 149 T.C. 1, with Jordan & Longhofer, supra note 10.
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See, e.g., BLM, supra note 19; McLaughlin, Conservation Proceeds, supra note 18; McLaughlin, TaxDeductible Conservation Easements and the Essential Perpetuity Requirements, supra note 18; McLaughlin, Valuation
Conundrum, supra note 3; Starkman, supra note 3.
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McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3.
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ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12, at 258-59; Colinvaux, Broken System, supra note 8, at 282-89.
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a. Non-Syndicated Easements
To Oakbrook Land Holdings, in the gallery of non-syndicated easements involving serious
overvaluation, we would add PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner.107 It differs from OLH in
involving an easement contributed by a long-standing landowner, but is similar in that it also
involved a nearly contemporaneous arm's-length sale of the land.108 PBBM had since 1996 operated a golf course about ten miles inland from Hilton Head, South Carolina, on 241 acres purchased
for $2.44 million and conveyed by a deed that restricted its use to recreation or as open space for
thirty years. Unable to operate at a profit, PBBM entered voluntary bankruptcy in 2006, and petitioned the court to lift the use restriction. It was opposed by (among others) a local property owners
association; but the POA agreed to waive its opposition, while PBBM agreed in return to permit the
POA to invoke the restriction to challenge any later development, and gave the POA an option to
purchase the land itself. The POA exercised its option in August 2007. Shortly thereafter the bankruptcy court approved a sale for $2.3 million, and in early December entered judgment invalidating
the use restriction as to the other adverse parties. In early January 2008 PBBM concluded the sale.
Not, however, before having contributed an easement over all but seven of the 241 acres, just
relieved of the pre-existing restriction, for which it claimed a "charitable" deduction of over $15
million in 2007.
The government argued that the deduction should be disallowed in its entirety, because the
easement (1) did not serve a conservation purpose, and (2) failed to protect "in perpetuity" whatever
conservation purpose it might serve; it also argued (3) that, in light of the pre-existing use
restriction, the reduction in value from the contributed restriction was only $100,000. The Tax
Court ruled for the government on all three.109 The Court of Appeals reversed as to the first. On the
second, however, in one of the first Court of Appeals decisions to construe the proportionate share
requirement in the "extinguishment" provision of Treasury Regulations § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii), it
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PBBM-Rose Hill, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 900 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2018). See also Mountanos v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1818 (2013), aff'd 651 F. App'x 592 (9th Cir. 2016), discussed by Professor McLaughlin in Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 271-72, and subsequently affirmed by the 9th Circuit. As described in note 81, supra, that
decision disallowed the deduction for an easement, contributed by the long-standing owner of a ranch, claimed to be
worth four times the value implied by the price for which the land eventually sold a dozen years later.
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In PBBM-Rose Hill the sale was negotiated before contribution of the easement but did not close until shortly
after contribution and the start of the following year. See supra Part III.B.2 and infra Part IV.B, which discuss the
shortcomings of Jordan and Longhofer's proposal and of recent legislative proposals, respectively.
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The Tax Court's opinion is unreported. At the conclusion of a 4-day trial the court delivered a detailed bench
opinion, available on the Tax Court's "DAWSON" web site, PBBM Rose-Hill, Ltd. v. Comm'r, No. 26096-14, https:
//dawson.ustaxcourt.gov/case-detail/26096-14 (T.C. Sept. 9, 2016).
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ruled in favor of the government.110 It also upheld the Tax Court on the valuation of the easement
and sustained the imposition of penalties for gross overvaluation.
The easement in PBBM-Rose Hill was contributed by a taxpayer that had held the land for
years. And though the taxpayer was a partnership, it had carried on an active (though unsuccessful)
business on the land, and could not reasonably have been disregarded as a "sham." There is also no
suggestion that the easement was marketed to outside investors; if that happened it would only have
occurred after the fact.111 The Tax Court found PBBM's sale to the POA for $2.3 million, even
110

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) allows for the judicial extinguishment of a conservation easement in the
unanticipated event that its conservation purposes can no longer be fulfilled, if by the terms of the easement the
"donee's proceeds" from the sale of the land freed of the easement must be used by the donee in furtherance of the
original conservation purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) provides:
Proceeds. . . . for a deduction to be allowed under this section, at the time of the gift the donor must agree that
the donation of the perpetual conservation restriction gives rise to a property right, immediately vested in the
donee organization, with a fair market value that is at least equal to the proportionate value that the perpetual
conservation restriction at the time of the gift, bears to the value of the property as a whole at that time.
There has been extensive litigation over whether that language prescribes the donee's share as (1) an amount, or (2) a
fractional share of the value of the property, in either event fixed at the time of contribution. There has also been
litigation over whether the donee's share satisfies the regulation if it may be reduced by the value of subsequent donor
improvements, claims (including mortgages liens) against the property, or costs of sale.
After extended consideration the court in PBBM-Rose Hill concluded that, despite ambiguity introduced by
the regulation's use of the term "proportionate value," it should be interpreted to require that the donee receive a fractional share of the proceeds of a subsequent sale. It then agreed that, since the easement in that case permitted the
donee's share to be reduced by both expenses of sale and the value of subsequent donor added improvements, it did not
satisfy the regulation. It did so, moreover, despite the existence of an earlier private letter ruling that permitted a
deduction where the document conveying the easement contained similar language. 900 F.3d at 207-08; I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 200836014 (Sept. 5, 2008). For earlier cases on other ways in which an easement may run afoul of the
proceeds regulation, such as reduction by 3rd-party debt, and using value allowed as a deduction rather than as
originally claimed, see, e.g., Kaufman v. Shulman, 687 F. 3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012); Carroll v. Comm'r, 146 T.C. 196
(2016).
The appellants in PBBM-Rose Hill petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the opinion "frustrate[d] the legitimate reliance interests of 'countless taxpayers, land trusts, and conservation agencies.'" See Coal Prop. Holdings, LLC v.
Comm'r, 153 T.C. 126, 140 n.4 (2019) (noting that land trust organizations had filed amicus briefs in a number of
cases, and evidently manifested an intense interest in securing a more liberal interpretation of the proceeds clause). The
intensity of their interest seems notable, given that one would not have expected that clause to come into play with
great frequency. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) it is triggered only by a "subsequent unexpected change" in
prevailing conditions that "make impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation
purposes." The taxpayers' petition for rehearing en banc was denied without dissent.
In Hewitt v. Commissioner, 21 F.4th 1336 (2021), the Eleventh Circuit upheld a challenge to the proceeds
regulation on the ground that, in not responding specifically to a handful of comments on that aspect of the regulations
proposed in 1983 and finalized in 1986, it had not satisfied the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Its
opinion echoed much of the reasoning of Judge Holmes' dissent in Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Commissioner,
154 T.C. 180, 230-59 (2020). On appeal of Oakbrook Land Holdings itself, the 6th Circuit addressed directly and
disagreed with the 11th Circuit's opinion in Hewitt, and sustained the proceeds regulation. See supra note 34.
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Given the concentration of conservation easement activity in the states of Georgia, Tennessee, and South
Carolina (see infra note 118), it is possible that PBBM-Rose Hill had that possibility in mind, though it is also possible
that the owners had sufficient income to make use of the easements themselves, as has occurred in some reported cases.
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though it closed after contribution of the easement, to be persuasive evidence of its true fair market
value. PBBM introduced evidence in an effort to show that development of the land was feasible;
the court was unpersuaded, observing in a bench opinion that "if PBBM had thought the property
was worth $15,680,000 because of its development potential, it would not have sold the property to
the subsidiary of the POA for only $2,300,000."112 It concluded, in short, that development was
unlikely, and that the price paid by the POA reflected the actual highest and best use of the land.
Given that sale, PBBM-Rose Hill thus involved a deduction for a non-syndicated easement
overvalued by over $15 million, or nearly seven times the value of the underlying land.113
Decisions like PBBM-Rose Hill and Oakbrook Land Holdings are not isolated; much early
litigation over conservation easements involved individualized, not syndicated, contributions.114
But a number of more recent opinions have been occasioned by easement contributions involving
syndication, and it is to them that we now turn. We emphasize, however, that none of them consist
of the transparently fraudulent, mass-marketed SCEs that have recently led to criminal indictments
and guilty pleas, nor even of the sort involving entities carrying on no real business activity other
than contributing an easement, and which might for that reason be challenged as a sham.
b. SCEs, in Brief
To highlight that reality, we begin by sketching the sort of retail SCE that at bottom is no
more than the window-dressed sale of deductions based on an inflated appraisal, as detailed in the
Senate Bipartisan Report. In its most compact form it involves the transfer of undeveloped land,
ideally held by the transferor for more than one year, to an entity (usually an LLC) taxed as a partnership, in return for interests in the partnership. Those interests are then marketed to outside
investors, followed by the contribution of an easement, with the easement valued to produce deductions equal to some multiple of (typically four to five times) the amounts paid by the investors for
See infra text and note at note 140.
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PBBM-Rose Hill, No. 26096-14, at 21-22. Although neither the Tax Court nor the Fifth Circuit seems to have
remarked on the issue, it is odd to find a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding willing to sell for $2.3 million property it
claims was worth over $15 million.
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Given the complete disallowance for non-compliance with the proceeds regulation, it is not meaningful to say by
what factor the claimed deduction was overvalued. In light of the $2.3 million sales price to the POA, the government's
valuation expert had put the value of the easement at $100,000; the Tax Court imposed no penalty on the tax
attributable to the first disallowed $100,000, and an overvaluation penalty with respect to the tax attributable to the
excess, presumably $15,060,000. 900 F.3d at 213-15.
114

See, e.g., Mountanos v. Comm'r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818 (2013), aff'd 651 F. App'x. 592 (9th Cir. 2016); Trout
Ranch, LLC v. Comm'r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 581 (2010); Hughes v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488 (2009); see also
McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 307-22 (appendices compiling previous façade easement and
conservation easement cases); Starkman, supra note 3, at 1485-88 (table summarizing conservation easement cases
from 2013 through 2018).
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their interests. Sale of the interests and contribution of the easement are completed more or less
simultaneously at the end of the taxable year. Since the partnership acquired the land in a nonrecognition transaction, the transferor's basis and holding period are preserved in its hands.
Consequently, the easement contribution is characterized as of property held for more than one year,
even though the investors acquired their interests in the LLC shortly before the contribution.115 In
the most transparent versions, the entity carries on no activities other than holding the land and contributing the easement. The window dressing consists of organizational documents that contemplate
multiple possibilities for the entity's future "activities," including "development" and "hold for
investment" options, as well as a "green option" -- contributing a conservation easement -- to be
adopted by a vote of the partners/investors. The green option is invariably chosen.116 The marketing materials assembled by the Senate Finance Committee include correspondence that reflects efforts to calibrate prospective investors' year-end purchases to their ability to make use of deductions
that year.117 These barebones SCEs are about as close as one can get to the outright sale of tax
deductions, masquerading as conservation.
c. Reported Decisions Involving Syndicated Easements
Most of the cases litigated to a decision -- including many with interests sold to outside
investors -- present a more complicated picture. In some the promoters do not appear initially to
have set out to acquire land with conservation easements in mind; in others it is not even obvious at
first glance that the conservation easement is to be syndicated. They do, however, have elements in
common, including geography118 and the recurring appearance of a relatively small revolving cast
of characters, including promoters, appraisers, syndicators, and recipient organizations.119 The
115

I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 I.R.B. 544.
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SENATE BIPARTISAN REPORT, supra note 6, at 14, 60 ff.
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Id. at 41-43.
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While a number of early easement cases seem to have originated in the west, a healthy fraction of recent opinions involve land concentrated in Georgia, South Carolina, or eastern Tennessee, which (along with parts of Florida and
western North Carolina) evidently contain a sizeable reservoir of rural land and have been an especially fertile breeding
ground for overvalued conservation easements. One is tempted to think of the region as a sort of "Southeast Triangle,"
in which Federal income tax liabilities mysteriously disappear. But it can happen anywhere that one can find vacant
land for sale at accessible prices and a cooperative appraiser.
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The individuals most often found producing inflated appraisals included (until his death) David R. Roberts.
Among other things, Mr. Roberts offered to value the OLH easement at over 15 times the year-earlier purchase price
for the underlying land (Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *8 n.3 (2020)), and
produced (among others) most of the appraisals in the HRH cases, described infra (see, e.g., Village at Effingham, LLC
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2020-102, at *4-5 n.3 (2020)). They also include Claud Clark, whose activities are recounted
supra at note 95. Common recipients include the Southeast Regional Land Conservancy, the Foothills Land
Conservancy, and the Georgia Land Trust. Regular recent promoters include HRH Investments (see infra note 123);
Nancy Zak (see infra text and note at note 133); and Peachtree Investment Solutions (see infra text and note at notes
136-140). See generally SENATE BIPARTISAN REPORT, supra note 6.
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following brief survey is selective, not extensive. It is intended primarily to develop factual aspects
of some reported decisions that will be of use in identifying shortcomings in solutions to this
problem that have previously been proposed.
Technical Deficiencies in Substantiation (RERI Holdings Redux). In the category of a land
acquisition that started out with other things in mind we would put the saga of HRH Investments
("HRH"). In mid-2007 HRH acquired from a paper producer for about $4.9 million two tracts of
land totaling about 1,900 acres in Effingham County, Georgia.120 As recited by the court in one
case, the tracts HRH purchased in 2007
abutted several properties that HRH's owners had previously developed. They intended to use the parent tract to expand on those adjacent developments, dividing it
into smaller lots for sale to homebuilders. These development plans were abandoned as the 2008-2009 financial crisis engulfed the Nation, with particular severity
on the housing market in the Southeastern states.121
That story is not implausible.122 The facts in a number of recent decisions reflect developers not so
much setting out from the start to burden land with conservation easements as turning down that
path in the wake of the 2008 real estate collapse. In any event, by 2008 HRH had turned to conservation easements in an effort to recoup its investment.
A more complete picture of what transpired involves some nine Tax Court decisions rendered over two years in eight separate proceedings. Through an affiliated entity, HRH formed at least
eight separate LLCs, each taxed as a partnership, and contributed portions of the parent tracts to
each, in each case in exchange for an ownership interest.123 Between 2009 and 2011, more than one
(and as much as three) years later, each LLC contributed to the Georgia Land Trust ("GLT") a
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Oakhill Woods, LLC v. Comm'r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1144 (2020). The opinions in several related cases only
mention a single tract, consisting of 1,490 acres priced (in round numbers) at $3,880,000 (about $2,600/acre). Oakhill
Woods identifies a second tract purchased the same day, consisting of 405 acres priced at $1,010,000 (about
$2,500/acre). Together, HRH purchased 1,900 acres for about $4,900,000.
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Belair Woods, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2018-159, at *3-4 (2018) (Belair Woods I).
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Effingham County lies just northwest of and adjacent to Savannah, and is included in the Savannah MSA, the
third largest (after Atlanta and Augusta) in Georgia. From 2000-2007 the County's population had grown by 35%; in
2007 it might well have looked attractive for development.
123

See Englewood Place, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2020-105, at *3 n.2 (2020). They included, besides Oakhill
Woods, Belair Woods I, and Englewood Place, supra, Cottonwood Place, LLC v. Comm'r, 120 T.C.M. (CCH) 91
(2020) (August 4); Maple Landing, LLC v. Comm'r, 120 T.C.M. (CCH) 23 (2020) (July 9); Red Oak Estates, LLC v.
Comm'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2020-116 (2020) (August 4); Riverside Place, LLC v. Comm'r, 120 T.C.M. (CCH) 19 (2020)
(July 9); and Village at Effingham, LLC v. Comm'r, 120 T.C.M. (CCH) 15 (2020) (July 9). See also Belair Woods,
LLC v. Comm'r, 120 T.C.M. (CCH) 73 (2020) (July 22). The reported opinions, details of which are summarized in the
Appendix, add up to only 1550 acres and average 194 acres. Since 1900 acres total were acquired by HRH, more
HRH-related LLCs are probably still out there. See also infra text at notes 126, 135, and 177.
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conservation easement covering all but four to ten acres of the land transferred to it by HRH.124
While the transferee LLCs received parcels of differing size, on average they were about 200 acres,
with a donated easement covering about 190, each having an average allocated share of HRH's
original 2007 purchase price of about $500,000.

The claimed deductions on account of the

contributed easements, all evidently appraised for that purpose by David R. Roberts,125 averaged a
bit over $5.3 million. In total they added up to about $42.3 million, attributable to land purchased
between one and three years earlier for under $4 million.126
The first of the HRH contributions to produce a reported opinion, based on a 2009 return,
was Belair Woods I. On December 18, 2008, HRH contributed 145 acres to Belair; just over a year
later, on December 30, 2009, Belair granted to GLT a conservation easement over 141 acres,
reserving the unencumbered four as two "home sites" for possible future residential development.
Belair claimed a charitable contribution deduction of $4,778,000, a valuation, the Tax Court noted,
that "presupposed that the 141.15 acres had increased in value by 1,380% during the worst real
estate crisis since the Great Depression."127
The case arose on an IRS motion for partial summary judgment that the contribution be
entirely disallowed for Belair's failure properly to substantiate it. Belair's documentation on Form
8283 (mis)described its interest in the underlying land as having been "acquired on August 1, 2007,
by 'purchase/exchange.'" Like RERI Holdings, Belair did not report its adjusted basis in the land.
In contrast with RERI, however, it provided an explanatory attachment, reciting that
the taxpayer's basis in the property is not included in * * * the attached Form 8283
because of the fact that the basis of the property is not taken into consideration in
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The easements typically recited that they were being granted to preserve "significant natural, scenic, aesthetic,
watershed, agricultural, forest, open space and plant habitat"; prohibited any "residential, commercial, and industrial
use of the conserved land," including "any improvements, . . . mining, . . . [and] dumping garbage." They did,
however, typically exclude two sites, aggregating fewer than 10 acres, "designated for residential development, . . .
[t]he boundaries of [which were] set forth in the Easement." They also reserved rights to engage in "forest management, . . . agricultural, . . . [and] recreational activities," as well as the right to construct driveways and install utility
services to the reserved homesites. E.g., Belair Woods I, T.C. Memo. 2018-159, at *4-5.
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See supra note 118. The Senate Committee on Finance highlights Roberts's involvement with several
conservation easement appraisals. See generally SENATE BIPARTISAN REPORT, supra note 6. The opinions in two
HRH cases, Cottonwood Place and Red Oak Estates, were not explicit about Roberts’s involvement.
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At an average cost of $4,900,000/1,900 = $2,580/acre, the 1,520 acres covered by the contributed easements represented 1,520/1,900 = 80% of HRH's acreage, having a ratably allocated $3,920,000 share of HRH's land cost.
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Belair Woods I, T.C. Memo. 2018-159, at *18; see also, e.g., Englewood Place, T.C. Memo. 2020-105, at *4-5
n.3. The markup from HRH's allocated cost to the LLC's claimed deduction occurred in two stages, initially when
HRH sold interests in the LLCs to outside investors, and then further when the claimed deduction for each LLC's
contribution was marked up over its investors' aggregate costs. See infra text and notes at notes 133-135 and 173-177.
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computing the amount of the deduction. . . . and the property further qualified as
"capital gain property."128
Guided by the full Tax Court's holding in RERI Holdings I, the court ruled that Belair had neither
strictly nor substantially complied with the reporting requirements of Form 8283 and the associated
regulations. In language that echoed the Tax Court's opinion in RERI Holdings I,129 and prefigured
that of the D.C. Circuit's affirmance in Blau, the court observed that strict compliance with the mandated disclosure of cost or adjusted basis was needed
to facilitate the Commissioner's efficient identification of overvalued property. The
cost of property typically corresponds to its FMV at the time the taxpayer acquired
it. . . . ("Actual sales are generally the best evidence of fair market value[.]"). When
a taxpayer claims a charitable contribution deduction for recently purchased
property, a wide gap between cost basis and claimed value raises a red flag
suggesting that the return merits examination. Unless the taxpayer complies with
the regulatory requirement that he disclose his cost basis and the date and manner of
acquiring the property, the Commissioner will be deprived of an essential tool that
Congress intended him to have.130
The court declined, however, to grant summary judgment, ruling that Belair's claim that it had relied
on professional advice, and so had "reasonable cause" under § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) for not meeting
the substantiation requirements, raised issues of fact to be resolved.131
The next decision, handed down in early 2020, was Oakhill Woods. In a cross-motion for
summary judgment filed shortly after the 2018 opinion in Belair I, Oakhill argued that, in requiring
disclosure of adjusted basis, both the regulations and Form 8283 were invalid. That, too, was
unsuccessful, with the court again disallowing the deduction, but again leaving open the possibility
of establishing reasonable cause for the failure of substantiation. A sequence of decisions following
Oakhill Woods sustained in relatively quick succession the complete disallowance of the deductions
in all seven remaining HRH cases (including Belair Woods) in which the taxpayers generally abandoned the reasonable cause defense. Aside from the basis omission, the government succeeded with
a parallel but independent ground for disallowance: the courts ruled that the "proceeds" clause in the
easement conveyances provided for the donee's share to be reduced both by subsequent donor
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Belair Woods I, T.C. Memo. 2018-159, at *7-8.
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RERI Holdings I, LLC v. Comm'r, 149 T.C. 1, 14 (2017) ("Congress intended the new substantiation
requirements to alert the Commissioner to potential overvaluations of contributed property and thus deter taxpayers
from claiming excessive deductions."), aff'd sub nom. Blau v. Comm'r, 924 F.3d 1261 (D.C. Cir 2019).
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Belair Woods I, T.C. Memo. 2018-159, at *17 (citations omitted).
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Id. at *24.
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improvements and claims against the property, in violation of Treasury Regulations § 1.170A14(g)(6)(ii), as construed in PBBM-Rose Hill and intervening Tax Court decisions.132
Left unexplained in all nine Tax Court opinions is how the interests in these LLCs were utilized, to whom they were ultimately sold, and whether they were in fact syndicated. Serendipitously,
the answer to those questions shows up in the opinion on a motion to dismiss in a separate
proceeding by the government against (among others) one Nancy Zak, for (among other things) promoting abusive SCE shelters in violation of I.R.C. § 6700.133 While it was alleged that since 2009
Ms. Zak had participated in promoting upwards of forty such shelters, only three were described
with specificity in either the complaint or the opinion on the motion. And while the details of the
allegations did not identify the non-defendant participants in the schemes that were described, one -denoted in both the complaint and the opinion as "Partnership Z" -- was described with sufficient
numerical particularity so that with confidence we can identify it with one of the HRH-promoted
LLCs, that in Cottonwood Place v. Commissioner.134 And from that we can tell, at least according
to the government's allegations, that shortly before its easement was contributed on December 31,
2009, the ownership interests in the Cottonwood LLC were sold to fifteen investors via a private
offering.135 So it is reasonable to infer that the other HRH-sponsored LLCs were similarly marketed, and that they in fact were syndicated conservation easements.
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See supra text and note at note 110; see also Coal Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 153 T.C. 126 (2019).
Reflecting identical documentation of the easements there is a marked similarly to the opinions, most written by Judge
Lauber. The final two, Red Oak Estates and Cottonwood Place, were decided solely on the failure to satisfy the
proceeds regulation.
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United States v. Zak, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2019); Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment of
Permanent Injunction Against Defendant Nancy Zak, Zak, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT). As of
March 30, 2022, the other defendants, Claud Clark and Eco-Vest Capital, Inc., had not settled.
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Compare id. at 1371 (describing "partnership Z") with Cottonwood Place, LLC v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 2010115 at *3-4 (2020). Partnership Z's easement covered "approximately" 135 out of 140 acres it held; it claimed a
deduction of $4,592,000; those are identical to Cottonwood Place, except that the latter contribution was described
more specifically as of 135.56 out of 140.56 acres. The government's complaint alleges a total of 13 such LLCs, of
which we have reported decisions in only 8. See Complaint at 22-23, United States v. Zak, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (N.D.
Ga. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT); supra note 123.
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Complaint at 24-27, United States v. Zak, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT). 99
units were sold on December 29, 2009, to 15 investors for a total of $853,380, plus an "operating reserve capital
contribution" of $99,900, a total of $953,370. The easement was contributed on December 31. So the investors'
contributions exceeded -- i.e., HRH marked them up -- by a factor of over 2.7 the $348,300 allocable cost to HRH of
the land contributed to Cottonwood Place (a calculation that ignores the costs of organizing the LLC, obtaining the
appraisal, documenting the easement, and marketing the interests to prospective investors). This appears to have been
among the earliest of the HRH LLCs, and Zak herself is alleged to have invested (¶ 72). Also of note is that the
deficiencies in the appraisal alleged in ¶ 76 of the complaint are strikingly similar to the outside expert's assessment of
the shortcomings in Claud Clark's appraisals made in the Alabama proceeding to revoke his appraiser's license, as
recounted in the SENATE BIPARTISAN REPORT, supra note 6, at 54-56; see also supra note 95.
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We are not here to defend either HRH investments or Nancy Zak. The Cottonwood appraisal (as well as all the other HRH appraisals) was culpably inflated: it was about thirteen times an
allocable share of what the parent tracts had cost HRH two and one-half years earlier, and over five
times what the Cottonwood investors paid for their interests. What we do question -- and all we
really question -- is whether, as described in the Tax Court opinions and in the government's
complaint in United States v. Zak, the partnerships/LLCs in question could successfully be challenged as shams. There was more to Cottonwood Place than just a parcel of undeveloped land,
owned by an LLC whose partners could simply choose among developing, holding, and
contributing an easement; each of them also owned land that was unburdened by the restrictions,
and could at some point (at least in principle) either be sold (with or without the burdened land) or
residentially developed. The only thing they were unambiguously guilty of was gross overvaluation
of the easements; without the tax benefits from that inflated appraisal they were a bad deal, at least
at the prices the investors had agreed to pay, but that aside there was nothing obviously
objectionable about them. The Service was on entirely solid -- and successful -- ground in challenging them in the fashion that it did. Indeed, putting aside the reliance on professional advice defense
(evidently abandoned following Oakhill Woods), after RERI Holdings they were low-hanging fruit;
the IRS obtained decisions disallowing the deductions through summary judgment. It is difficult to
imagine that the IRS would have been well advised, or secured victories more readily, either by
challenging the LLCs as "shams," or proceeding directly to challenge the valuations.
Professionally Syndicated Easements. A second set of recent decisions all involve the donation of an easement with respect to land contributed to an LLC that was then acquired by one of a
series of investment funds, each put together by an Atlanta firm -- Peachtree Investment Solutions -that specialized in organizing and syndicating interests in those funds. Each such case involved the
transfer of just under a 99% interest in the LLC, at what was effectively an arm's-length price; thereafter an easement valued at a substantial multiple of that price was contributed to a regional land
conservancy. All were successfully challenged by the government, several on multiple grounds, but
in each case the deduction was actually disallowed for its failure to satisfy the regulations' proceeds
requirement, as construed in PBBM-Rose Hill. The lead case was Coal Property Holdings,136 in
which the government advanced multiple grounds for disallowance, including defects in documentation, valuation (the government claimed $0), and the failure of the proceeds provision (which
again allowed the donee's proceeds to be reduced by subsequent donor improvements and claims
against the land) to satisfy the regulations’ perpetuity requirement. The Tax Court ruled for the
government on the latter ground. As the easements in almost all the other cases were implemented
136

153 T.C. 126 (2019).
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with transfer documents like those in Coal Property Holdings, adverse rulings in those cases
followed as a matter of course.137
All these contributions were clearly intended to be syndicated: some 99% of each LLC was
acquired by one of Peachtree's "investment funds"; most involved appraisals by Mr. Roberts; and
the participants (including the syndicator) have recently been named in a class action brought on
behalf of investors in several of the funds.138 We assume that, as syndicated easements, they are
among the transactions that Jordan & Longhofer deem worthy of being challenged, and view as
more properly and productively to be challenged as shams.
We delve into them for two reasons. One is that, as matters turned out, in at least two
instances the fund that acquired the LLC was not marketed to a collection of public investors but
sold to just one investor.139 By itself that might not foreclose a ruling that, as actually structured, the
LLCs to which the land was transferred were not legitimately partnerships. In one of those cases,
however, a little under 4% of the land, consisting of two contiguous parcels with lake frontage
totaling ninety acres and suitable for future development, was not restricted by the easement; as with
the LLCs organized by HRH, the possibility of future development of the unburdened land would at
least have presented an obstacle to their being disregarded as shams.140 That detail aside, where a
single major investor (or even a small group of investors) was involved, the LLC could with
rudimentary foresight be endowed with sufficient other activity to plan around decisions in which
the IRS succeeded in characterizing some of the more barebones SCE partnerships as shams. So,
just as with the HRH-sponsored LLCs, it is far from obvious that the IRS would have enjoyed better
(or at least easier) success if it had pursued some sort of "sham entity" approach to challenging these
contributions than by adopting the litigation strategy that it did. And, not to put too fine a point on
it, whether or not the LLCs involved could have successfully been challenged as shams, they did in
fact entail abusively elevated valuations, they deserved to be disallowed, and the Service's
challenge, on however technical the grounds, was a challenge that deserved to be mounted and to
succeed.
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In one case, Railroad Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1136 (2020), the easement failed to satisfy
the proceeds regulation because it allocated to the donee a fixed share, rather than a fixed percentage of the proceeds, as
PBBM-Rose Hill and Coal Property Holdings had construed the regulation to require. See also TOT Prop. Holdings,
LLC v. Comm'r, No. 5600-17, 2019 WL 11880554 (T.C. Nov. 22, 2019), aff'd 1 F.4th 1354 (11th Cir. 2021); Plateau
Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1619 (2020).
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Peskin v. Peachtree Inv. Sol., No. 1:21-CV-00002 (N.D. Ga.).
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See Coal Prop. Holdings, 153 T.C. at 127; Plateau Holdings, T.C. Memo. 2020-93, at *2. Each case involved
the acquisition by the investor of an approximately 99% interest in the LLC.
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The unburdened 90-acre tract was donated for use as a youth camp the following year. See Plateau Holdings,
T.C. Memo. 2020-93, at *8 n.5.
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One final point deserves mention. In any number of recent cases the deductions have been
challenged and disallowed on technical grounds. Given the regular assessment of overvaluation
penalties, however, their complete resolution has required valuing the easement, and that, in turn -at least in the absence of settlement -- has required a trial. In some instances the trial was brief; in
Plateau Holdings, the other Peachtree case involving a single outside investor, it took only a day.
Others have required longer: the trial in RERI Holdings, much of it about valuation, consumed four
days; PBBM-Rose Hill took six.

Given the intrinsically complex nature of before and after

valuation, it is a costly way of resolving these disputes, one that has elicited more than its fair share
of judicial dissatisfaction.141 As private actors adjust future contributions to the requirements
dictated by recent decisions, we can reasonably anticipate more, not less, litigation over valuation,
certainly in the absence of more fundamental reform.
C. To Sum Up
Valuing conservation easements has proved to be even more daunting than anticipated. It
requires multiple appraisals, not merely of a partial interest in transferable real property, but of a
contributed, non-marketable, intangible partial interest itself.

That, in turn, has facilitated

capitalizing on the pre-existing vulnerability of the appreciated property rule in an unprecedented
way; with hypothetical, "highest and best use" DCF calculations routinely used to produce inflated
"before" valuations, there is no real upper limit on the magnitude of the deductions that might be
claimed. The practice has been rationalized by the specious assertion that restrictions on the
development of land may by an alchemy-like process somehow be transmuted into something worth
more than the land itself. The coalescence of these features has left the deduction for contributions
of conservation easements singularly vulnerable to exploitation, and among all charitable contributions of appreciated property uniquely susceptible to abuse.
Despite this they have, thus far at least, escaped serious corrective attention. Congress
instead has been persuaded to treat them more generously than other gifts of appreciated property.
In 2006 it temporarily liberalized for conservation easements the limitations that otherwise apply to
contributions of long-term capital gain, allowing them to the extent of 50% (and in some cases
100%) rather than 30% of contributors' adjusted gross incomes.142 Those liberalizations were made
141

See supra note 21.

142

I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E), added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1206(a)(1), 120 Stat.
780, 1068 (2006). The 2006 Pension Protection Act also lengthened the carryover period for excess conservation
easement contributions by a factor of three. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1206(a)(2) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(2)(B))). On the other hand it did in some respects address valuation abuse, adding § 6695A, which imposes a
penalty on appraisers whose work leads to a substantial or gross overvaluation penalty under § 6662. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 1219(b). See also the recent lawsuit filed by three appraisers against the IRS seeking to enjoin
enforcement of § I.R.C. § 6695A, supra text and note at note 15.
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permanent in 2016, despite admonitions in the interim that the push to obtain them might be driven
more by the susceptibility of § 170(h) to extraordinary valuation abuse than by exceptional donor
generosity.143

They have, if anything, augmented the temptations to overvalue conservation

easements.
In that environment, despite its critics and especially given the 2006 liberalizations, the IRS
appears to have gone about challenging deductions for conservation easements in a measured,
strategically effective way. That is all the more so given the increasingly aggressive valuation
during the past fifteen years, corroborated by more recent cases like those surveyed in Part III.B.3.
As a result, the criticisms of its conduct recounted in Part I, and the alternatives offered by critics
like Jordan & Longhofer and Judge Holmes, seem poorly conceived. The discussion thus far has
already dealt in some detail with the former; it should suffice to add that their proposal to combat
SCEs by attacking their syndicating vehicles as shams, while conceivably effective against the most
transparently fraudulent SCEs recounted in the Senate Bipartisan Report, would face an uphill battle
with most of the more recent cases we have surveyed. And given its premise that the problem is
confined to SCEs, it expressly does nothing to combat overvaluation of individual easement
contributions. It would thus be ineffective at dealing with anything but the most flagrantly abusive
SCEs.144
Judge Holmes is equally critical of the IRS, but at the other end of the spectrum in terms of a
solution. He ruled against the taxpayer in his memorandum opinion in Oakbrook Land Holdings
(although he did set aside the government's imposition of penalties).145 The taxpayer's challenge to
the validity of the proceeds regulation under which its easement was invalidated was rejected by the
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See, e.g., McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 229; Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 48 nn.
37-38. Even before those liberalizations were first adopted in 2006, a 2005 survey of possible compliance options by
the Joint Committee on Taxation had suggested the need to curtail aggressive valuation. See STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, 28285 (2005) [hereinafter JCT 2005 COMPLIANCE OPTIONS].
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SCEs are so self-evidently abusive that, once identified, the government has in some instances succeeded in
securing either injunctive relief or guilty pleas in criminal proceedings. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Atlanta
Tax Professionals Plead Guilty to Promoting Syndicated Conservation Easement Tax Scheme Involving More Than
$1.2 Billion in Fraudulent Charitable Deductions (Dec. 21, 2020) (announcing guilty pleas of easement-related criminal
fraud by two Atlanta tax professionals); supra note 133. Such remedies do not, however, address the more general
problem of overvalued easements.
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Owing to the fact that one respect in which the grant violated the proceeds regulation (see supra note 110) had
been the subject of an earlier favorable private ruling letter, Judge Holmes concluded that in relying on the PLR Horton
had acted with "reasonable cause and in good faith" and so absolved him of the negligence penalty the IRS had
assessed. Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2020-54, at *39-44 (2020). In doing so he seems to
have overlooked the fact that the easement also allocated to the donee organization a fixed amount equal to the value
for which a deduction was originally claimed, rather than a fixed fraction of the sale proceeds, a defect in the grant that
independently violated the proceeds regulation, and for which the PLR offered no comfort. See supra note 110.
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full Tax Court, twelve judges joining the majority and three concurring in the result on varying
grounds.146 Judge Holmes’ was the lone dissent. At the conclusion of a lengthy opinion, he, too,
was critical of the technical objections the government has been interposing in challenging
conservation easement deductions.147 To him,
[c]onservation-easement cases might have been more reasonably resolved case-bycase in contests of valuation. The syndicated conservation-easement deals with
wildly inflated deductions on land bought at much lower prices would seem perfectly fine fodder for feeding into a valuation grinder. Valuation law is reasonably well
known, and valuation cases are exceptionally capable of settlement.148
With all due respect we think that gets the matter almost exactly wrong. To say, in effect, that
enforcement directed at efforts to exploit § 170(h) should ideally consist of case-by-case litigation
of value would consign the government to remaining bogged down in a swamp of litigation; it
would continue to reward aggressive valuation, all but ensuring settlements on unjustifiably taxpayer-friendly terms. It runs counter to the 1981 congressional insight that led to the regime of
overvaluation penalties in the first place,149 penalties that have obviously proved insufficient to
overcome the high-powered incentives to contributing overvalued conservation easements.150 It is
myopic to believe, as the quotation suggests, that "syndicated conservation-easement deals with
wildly inflated deductions" will somehow automatically be weeded out by valuation from everything else.151

Even the ABA-RPTE section report, while expressing no opinion about whether
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Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm’r, 154 T.C. 180 (2020), aff’d, No. 20-2117 (6th Cir. Mar. 14, 2022);
see McLaughlin, Conservation Proceeds, supra note 18.
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While not actually claiming that the challenged easements were free of overvaluation, he insinuates as much
when he complains that the Tax Court had
come to a point where we are disallowing a great many conservation-easement deductions altogether, not for exaggeration of their value or lack of conservation purpose, but because of very
contestable readings of what it means for an easement to be perpetual. . . . Today we uphold a
regulation that will invalidate who knows how many other conservation-easement deductions.
Oakbrook Land Holdings, 154 T.C. at 258-59 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 258 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See supra text and notes at notes 61-64. It calls to mind Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960),
which cast the lower federal courts adrift in a sea of litigation, exhorting them to resolve essentially every income tax
dispute about the ambit of the gift exclusion by ascertaining, "based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding
tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case," id. at 289,
whether a particular transfer had been prompted by "detached and disinterested generosity." Id. at 285.
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McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 302-05.
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It is ironic to find that assessment articulated by the trial judge in a case the facts of which -- a nearly $10 million
deduction claimed for contributing an easement on land purchased barely a year earlier for under $1.3 million -- almost
paradigmatically falsify that belief. If Roberts' $9.545 million valuation -- to say nothing of his originally proposed
$19.5 million, with which even Mr. Horton and his colleagues "didn't feel comfortable" -- does not qualify as "wildly
inflated" it is hard to know exactly what does. When Judge Holmes goes on to muse about the "who knows how many
other conservation-easement deductions" that the Tax Court's decision will be "disallowing . . . altogether" are free
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easement valuation should be of priority concern for the IRS, acknowledges that "neither the
Service nor the courts have sufficient resources to effectively police valuation abuses."152
In short, neither suggestion offers a viable solution to the problem of conservation easement
valuation abuse. One narrowly tailored to the most transparently objectionable SCEs would leave
much overvaluation untouched. Relinquishing technical challenges and litigating only valuation, on
the other hand, would be impracticable, and would require resources the IRS does not have.
Despite all the criticism, the government's efforts to date have not amounted to some unprovoked
war on legitimate easement contributions; nor has the evidence been marshalled that the Tax Court's
decisions have deterred carefully documented, reasonably valued easement contributions. The
cases the government has challenged, even on technical grounds, have almost invariably involved
more than trivial overvaluation.
IV.

SOLUTIONS
At this juncture it is more productive to ask "Could the government do better?" at

combatting conservation easement abuse. We preface our answer by recalling that in 1984, when
Congress decided not to curtail directly the appreciated property rule, the committee reports
acknowledged that its substantiation and penalty alternatives might not "prove sufficient to preclude
taxpayers from overvaluing charitable donations of property in all circumstances," and admonished
the IRS and Treasury "to notify the tax-writing committees if there are any continuing valuation
concerns that should be addressed by further legislation."153 If anything has ever raised concerns
that warranted such action, conservation easements are it. We start by describing and identifying
shortcomings in other solutions that have been proposed to date, and then turn to what we think
must be done to address the problem effectively.
A. Proposed Administrative Solutions
One approach consists of proposals to tighten the administration of § 170(h) and to enhance
transparency with respect to conservation easement contributions. They consist principally of a
menu of recommendations in 2016 by the Obama administration,154 criticisms of and alternatives to
from "exaggeration of their value," he (like Jordan & Longhofer) offers no evidence for his speculation. Oakbrook
Land Holdings, 154 T.C. at 258-59.
152

ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12, at 331-32.
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1984 ACT BLUEBOOK at 504-05, supra note 63; see supra text and notes at notes 64-68.
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See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 213-17 (2016) [hereinafter 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS]. Ten years earlier a series of compliance
recommendations surveyed by the Joint Committee on Taxation had included a series of administrative reforms,
including a proposal to reduce deductions claimed with respect to conservation (but not facade) easements by a factor
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which were developed by Professor McLaughlin in 2016155 and further considered in the 2018
ABA-RPTE Task Force Report.156
The Obama administration proposed, among other things,157 stiffening the requirements
governing both the contribution and receipt of conservation easements. It would have tightened the
criteria for an organization to be eligible to receive deductible easement contributions. It would also
have required donors to describe in detail the conservation purposes of and the public benefits from
each contribution, and would have required recipient organizations to attest to the accuracy of the
stated purposes and benefits, and to the fair market value reported to the IRS. It also proposed
requiring public disclosure by recipients (in redacted form) of much of the same information
currently required to be reported by donors on Form 8283.158
In her 2016 article on valuation, Professor McLaughlin likewise proposed administrative
reforms, including extending to six years the statute of limitations on auditing conservation
easements, and requiring donor reporting in enhanced and somewhat more standardized detail on
Form 8283.159 She also proposed increased penalties for overvaluation, in particular those imposed
on appraisers.160
At the same time she was dismissive of the Obama administration's proposal to require
detailed easement disclosure by recipient organizations, and recipient involvement in attesting to
conservation purposes, public benefits, and the value of easement contributions, asserting that such
of two-thirds, implicitly equivalent to a 23% excise on easement contributions by a 35% bracket donor. See JCT 2005
COMPLIANCE OPTIONS, supra note 143, at 282-83.
155
156

McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 292-306; see also BLM, supra note 19, at 7-11.
ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12, at 331-43.
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It proposed narrowing the statutory definition of "conservation purposes," included a pilot project of officially
allocated conservation easement tax credits, and would have categorically denied deductions for open space easements
on golf courses. 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS at 215-16.
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The current regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-16, prescribing what must be disclosed by donors of property in
Part II.B of Form 8283, include the appraised value of the contribution, the date and manner of acquisition, and the
donor's adjusted basis. Part II of Schedule D to Form 990 requires some disclosure by recipients of information pertaining to easements received, but the requirements are not detailed and apply only in the aggregate.
The Obama administration, in contrast, proposed "public disclosure by donee organizations . . . sufficient for
transparency and accountability including: detailed descriptions of the subject property and the restrictions imposed on
the property, the conservation purposes served by the easement, and any rights retained by the donor or related persons;
the fair market value of both the easement and the full fee interest in the property at the time of the contribution; and a
description of any easement modifications or actions taken to enforce the easement that were taken during the taxable
year." 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS at 215-216. The disclosures contemplated by that passage, which by its terms
applied only to donees, is more stringent than what is currently required by Form 8283; although not made explicit the
more stringent requirements presumably would have been imposed in parallel on donors.
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reforms "are unlikely to significantly reduce overvaluation."161 McLaughlin's skepticism is neither
completely spelled out nor convincing. Her case for not requiring recipient organizations to attest to
valuation seems to be that they would have "an incentive to assert high values," knowing if they do
so "that property owners are more likely to donate."162 That assessment seems questionable if, as
the administration also proposed, a donee found complicit in overvaluation would jeopardize its
exemption.163 But even granting that responsibility for valuation would be better left to donors
(and, as McLaughlin proposes, appraisers), she gives no real reason for relieving recipient
organizations of responsibility for attesting to the conservation purposes of and public benefits from
contributed easements. If a recipient is incapable of that, it is hard to justify their qualifications to
receive and to administer such interests in the first place. Beyond that she is critical even of
Treasury's proposal to require public disclosure of easement details by donee organizations, noting
only that "easement valuation is a complex process with which most people" are unfamiliar. She
offers the conjecture that "such disclosures seem unlikely to curb valuation abuse except perhaps at
the outer margin, where the prospect of public shaming might chill some of the most outrageous
valuations." But valuation was only one of several things that the administration proposed to be
disclosed, the balance of which McLaughlin does not appear to address.
Even if chilling a few "outrageous valuations" were all that they directly accomplished, the
proposed disclosures would reduce the government's need to rely exclusively on examining personal or partnership returns to detect extreme valuations, of which on the evidence of recent decisions
there have been more than an isolated few. In that respect it seems like a step in the right direction - certainly if donees are required to report but not attest to donor valuations -- especially when it can
be achieved at the trivial cost of requiring donees to share with the IRS and the public information
that donors must in any event disclose to them whenever a contribution is made. It seems to us that
McLaughlin's criticism misses the real point of, and almost surely understates the benefits of,
detailed donee disclosure: even if by itself it deterred nothing, it would provide more concentrated
sources of information about conservation easement contributions, to the government and the public
alike. By so doing it would more generally facilitate IRS detection of potentially overvalued
contributions.164 One hardly needs a game-theoretic model to think that the resulting increase in the
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Id. She adds that if forced to obtain their own appraisals, given the alignment of their incentives, donors and
donees might gang up on the government in valuation disputes. Id. at 292-93.
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probability of detection will increase the expected cost of aggressive valuation. There is much to be
said for exactly the sort of disclosure that the Obama administration proposed.165
B. Capping Valuation
Proposals to tighten the allowance, reporting of, and disclosure about conservation
easements deserve serious consideration. They do not, however, add any real teeth to efforts to
combat valuation abuse. Legislation along the lines of S. 2256 would do better.166 If adopted, such
bills would prohibit any deduction on account of a conservation easement contributed through a
pass-through entity by an investor/partner if, during any of the first three years following the last
date on which the partnership acquired any portion of the contributed property, or (if later) on which
any partner acquired an interest in the partnership, the amount of the deduction would exceed 2.5
times the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership allocable to the property with
respect to which the contribution is made.167 It converts into a bright-line limitation the standard
articulated in Notice 2017-10 for classifying syndicated easements as listed transactions.168 Its
premises seem to be that (1) the problem of valuation abuse is largely confined to easement contributions the benefits of which are distributed to investors in pass-through entities, (2) limiting
those investors to first-year deductions just sufficient (at best) to produce tax savings equal to their
investments, and (3) a statutorily mandated three-year wait to secure larger deductions from syndi165

Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 57-58, would go farther and identify easement donors. On possible
administrative reforms the ABA-RPTE Task Force has little to add. In the 12 of its 124 pages devoted to valuation, it
generally aligns itself with several of Professor McLaughlin's recommended reforms (she was among its authors). That
aside it throws cold water on most of the Treasury's 2016 proposals. It's a fair inference that, to the report's authors as a
whole, fixing valuation is little more than an afterthought. See ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12; supra text and note
at note 54. Most of it is devoted to making a case for added "flexibility" in the administration of conservation
easements. Despite the fact that the provision to which the Treasury agreed 40 years ago required that to be deductible
a conservation restriction must both be "granted" and its "conservation purposes . . . protected in perpetuity," the report
proposes the wholesale introduction of expanded discretionary and consensual powers to amend and even extinguish
conservation easements for which deductions have previously been allowed. Only in connection with their
recommended expansion of the ability to alter conservation easements after the fact does the Task Force propose
anything in the way of meaningful restrictions and serious sanctions (such as loss of exemption), and only then to
prevent abuse of the new opportunities for abuse that their proposals would inevitably introduce. They propose serious
sanctions (such as loss of exemption) only in the context of relaxing restrictions on amendment and extinguishment.
Internal evidence suggests that its hedged language on valuation and other issues reflects differences among the authors
on matters both of allowance and taxation. See, e.g., ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12, at 331-32, 359 n.207 ("The
Task Force has not had an opportunity to reach consensus on a resolution to the dilemma occasioned by the decision in
PBBM-Rose Hill.").
166

S. 2256, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021); H.R. 4164, 117th Cong. (1st Sess. 2021).

167

S. 2256, 117th Cong., § 2(a). The proposed legislation would also prescribe additional rules regarding tiered
partnerships, family partnerships, penalties, and the statute of limitations. Id. at § 2(a)-(c).
168

The standard prescribed in that Notice and carried forward into legislation like S. 2256 seems to have been
inspired by Small, Modest Proposal, supra note 16. See supra note 17.

46

cated easements with more aggressive valuations will collectively suffice to deter investment in
SCEs. It would, in effect, limit the tax benefits of contributing an easement to a 40% marginal rate
investor to the amount invested, thereby killing the economics of contributions to which it
applied.169 In so doing it would largely put a stop to the sort of syndicate-December 29/contributeDecember 31 SCEs described in the Senate Bipartisan Report and Notice 2017-10, as well as
syndicated easements of the sort that have been promoted by HRH Investments and Peachtree
Investment Solutions.
At the same time its premises do not seem sufficiently well thought out. For one thing,
overvaluation is not confined to contributions made by pass-through entities, but has been (and
continues to be) widespread among individual easement contributions. It may be that conservation
easement flips are typically marketed to outside investors, as happened with the HRH cases
discussed in Part III. Even so, it is possible that, as a successful real estate developer, someone like
Duane Horton might have acquired the property in Oakbrook Land Holdings individually (or jointly
with a few close associates), at least if he was willing to shoulder the risks.170 If so, S. 2256, by
itself, would not have affected his (claimed) $9.545 million deduction.
For another, Notice 2017-10 itself used the 2.5/1 ratio of deductions to investment to single
out conservation easements for scrutiny. By converting that standard into a prohibition, S. 2256
could be taken as condoning claimed deductions not in excess of 2.5 times adjusted basis, even for
property held through a pass-through entity and that had recently changed hands at arm's-length. So
while that limitation might halt syndicated investments whose "economics" were driven solely by
the first-year easement contribution,171 it might have just the opposite impact on investors not
focused solely on conservation easement-derived year-one returns, but otherwise still interested in
the most feasibly aggressive valuation of their contribution. For them a provision like S. 2256 could
be interpreted as a safe harbor.172
The bill would also be vulnerable to exploitation by investors prepared to be patient. Take,
for example, a rounded version of Partnership Z in United States v. Zak, almost surely based on Cot169

See supra note 25. At any lower marginal rate the tax benefits -- during the first year and in the aggregate -would be insufficient even to recoup the investment. If, on the other hand, marginal rates were to go up the calculus of
S. 2256 would change.
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See supra text and note at note 24.
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The allocated cost of the 106 acres burdened by the easement in Oakbrook Land Holdings was about $1.26 million (see supra note 37), yielding an S. 2256 limit of $3.15 million. If Horton's investors were less aggressive, and
prepared to settle for "just" that valuation, at 35% the tax benefits would have been just over $1.1 million, reducing
OLH's investment in all 143 acres net of tax savings to under $600,000, from which point they could have proceeded in
some fashion to develop the 37 unburdened acres. Even with the easement valued at 2.5 times what they had recently
paid for the unburdened underlying land, S. 2256 could be taken as saying "That's ok."
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tonwood Place v. Commissioner: the investors purchased their interests for a total of $950,000,173
and contributed an easement for which they claimed a value of $4,600,000, nearly five times their
aggregate investments. It would clearly run afoul of S. 2256. Suppose, however, that the investors,
although acquiring the land and investing in the LLC near the end of some Year 0, were prepared to
wait until the end of Year 3 before contributing the easement, so that the limitation of S. 2256 did
not apply. At a 35% marginal rate, a $4,600,000 Year 3 deduction would produce tax savings of
$1,610,000 and would, in the absence of a successful valuation challenge by the government, still
produce for the investors a compound average annual return of nearly 19%.174
S. 2256's implicit faith in the deterrent effect of impatience does not seem well founded,
except in the context of the instant-gratification world of atypically high-powered tax shelters consisting of conservation easement flips; in that world aggressive valuation has produced tax-driven
investments claimed to produce essentially unprecedented instantaneous payoffs, realized entirely in
the first year, both within and outside the set of SCEs.175 Those preoccupied with killing off the
most flagrant SCEs seem to have lost sight of just how unusual (at least if they are allowed to
succeed) such essentially guaranteed all-but-instantaneous payoffs are.

In contrast, in quaint

artifacts like traditional real estate tax shelters of the past, investors did have to exhibit some
patience,176 just as the world more generally requires of ordinary investors. So there is no guarantee
that, if prospective investors had to adjust to the three-year wait imposed by a bill like S. 2256, they
would be unwilling to do so. The LLCs created by HRH Investments contributed their easements
between two and four years following HRH's purchase of the parent tract of land; with modest
adjustments to timing, and investors sufficiently patient to invest at the beginning, S. 2256 would
not have automatically foreclosed the deduction actually claimed in Cottonwood Place. There was,
moreover, room for HRH to have sweetened the deal, if needed to reward the requisite patience.177
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See supra text and notes at notes 134 and 135. According to the opinion in Zak, partnership Z sold 99 interests
for $9,630 each, a total of $953,370. United States v. Zak, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
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The cash flows at time 0 and in years 1-3 would be ($950,000), $0, $0, $1,610,000, producing an internal rate of
return of 19.22%. If they were able to finance the purchase of their interests, say by borrowing 80% (a total of
$760,000) at 15%, and even assuming that because of, say, § 163(d), the interest was not deductible, the compound
annual return on their $190,000 net outlay would rise to over 28%. The cash flows would be ($190,000), ($114,000),
($114,000), $736,000. We suspect that these simple illustrations just scratch the surface of how S. 2256 might be
exploited. (Calculations are available from the authors.)
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Cottonwood Place was the transferee of 140 acres from HRH, of which 135 were subject to the easement.
HRH's average cost/acre was $4,900,000/1900 = $2580; the cost ratably allocated to the land, carried over to Cottonwood Place and subject to the easement, was about $348,300. See supra text and notes at notes 135 and 136. For their
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That is not something we condone, much less are convinced would survive a valuation challenge;
we are simply pointing out that, even with a three-year waiting period, and assuming elimination of
the rectifiable technical flaws that led to disallowance in the actual HRH cases, the government
might still end up bogged down in time-consuming litigation over valuation. Planning around S.
2256 would have been even less complicated for small groups like the investors in Oakbrook Land
Holdings, who in lieu of settling for a more modest easement valuation could simply have elected to
exercise the requisite patience, developing the thirty-seven acres not subject to the easement in the
interim, and claiming a larger deduction once S. 2256's holding period restriction had lapsed.
It is unlikely that what we have just sketched exhausts the ongoing possibilities for exploiting aggressive valuation of conservation easements, including those made through pass-through
entities, if first-year deductions were limited to 2.5 times investment. Our point, then, is that
legislation like S. 2256, in its current form, would not necessarily deter even some of the more
aggressively valued deals found in the reported decisions, especially not for investors prepared to be
patient. It would certainly not deter any easement contributed through a pass-through entity and
valued at less than 2.5 times the investors' adjusted bases. Contributions within that envelope might
not qualify as "wildly" inflated, but they are inflated, especially when the benchmark comparison is
the price in a recent arm's-length sale. And it would do nothing to curb overvaluation of easements
contributed outside a pass-through entity. S. 2256 thus would not provide a comprehensive, or even
an adequate, solution.
C. The Centrality of the Appreciated Property Rule
In fashioning a limitation related to basis, however, S. 2256 does edge closer to a real
solution. The core of the problem is the allowance of deductions for contributions of unrealized
appreciation, or at least the extension of that rule to contributions of conservation easements.
Despite that reality, tinkering with the appreciated property rule has been so studiously avoided as a
possible solution that it might reasonably be regarded as the third rail of the problem.178 That concerted obliviousness is surely fueled by apprehension about the consequences; but it probably rests
also on an ingrained, reflexive belief that allowing fair market value deductions for contributions of
appreciated long-term capital gain property is sacrosanct, an inviolable, immutable feature of the
natural order of things. As Kingsbury Browne, both the spiritual and practical father of the contributed conservation easement enterprise, long ago (rhetorically) asked of a Treasury official, "Isn't
Reducing their aggregate investment from, say, $950,000 to $600,000 -- still producing for HRH a gross profit on
syndicating the interests of $250,000 -- would have produced 3-year cash flows of ($600,000), $0, $0, $1,610,000,
increasing their compound return to nearly 40%.
178

The authors of the ABA-RPTE Report, many of them tax lawyers or estate planners, evidently went out of their
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49

your real problem with the appreciated property rule? If, so, why don't you go after that?"179 If
doing so seemed untenable at the time, and the answer wasn't then even clear, it should by now be
apparent to any reasonably impartial observer of what has unfolded since: in the wake of their 1980
statutory blessing and the 2006 liberalizations,180 conservation easements have emerged as uniquely
capable of exploiting and transgressing any reasonable boundaries on the operation of that rule.
The natural starting point in coming up with a solution to the problem is whatever was actually paid for the unburdened land,181 the owner's adjusted basis. At very least with respect to land
that recently changed hands in a taxable arm's length transaction, that should be the ceiling, on both
the "before" value of the land182 and of any deduction for contributing a conservation easement. As
recounted above, what has been lost sight of, and so has with few exceptions been missing from the
discussion of conservation easement reform, is just how extraordinary a departure from our
otherwise generally applicable income tax norms allowing deductions for unrealized appreciation is.
In virtually all other instances we limit the amount deductible on the disposition of property to
basis.183 And although as an historical matter the system has tolerated fair market value deductions
for contributions of appreciated property, Kingsbury Browne's rhetorical question over forty years
ago simply glossed over what should by now be obvious -- and what the tax-writing congressional
committees had grasped by just a few years later, more than thirty-five years ago184 -- and that is
just how fragile and vulnerable that tolerance is.
Conservation easements are just an extreme symptom of that more general problem. They
push the intrinsic vulnerability of the appreciated property rule beyond acceptable limits. They have
proved capable of generating outcomes that differ not just quantitatively, but qualitatively, from
other contributions of appreciated property. But they are not the first episode to dramatize that
fragility. As recounted in Part II, that consisted of contributions of ordinary income property at a
time when marginal rates exceeded 50%. Then, even with fastidiously fair valuation, a taxpayer
could do better by contributing property and deducting its fair market value than by selling it
instead. That possibility, too, was compounded by aggressive valuation, facilitated, most commonly with non-fungible tangible assets like art, by the need to rely on appraisals. Faced with that
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combination of vulnerabilities -- the possibility of achieving the best strictly financial outcome by
contributing rather than selling the property,185 exacerbated by the use of inherently malleable
appraised valuation in doing so186 -- Congress responded with § 170(e)(1)(A), which effectively
limits contributions of ordinary income property to basis.187 By doing so it put them on essentially
the same income tax footing as other dispositions of property. And it has continued to do so despite
the fact that, just a decade later, Congress reduced the top marginal rate to 50%, at or below which it
has remained ever since. Even more to the point, Congress has selectively extended the basis
limitation of I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) to categories of contributions of long-term capital gain property
thought to be vulnerable to abuse.188 But it has still left the latter largely undisturbed, despite its
recognition in 1984 that doing so posed serious risks to the system.
Conservation easements have now emerged to highlight for a second time, in a slightly different but in some ways even more spectacular fashion, the vulnerability of the appreciated property
rule. The $9.545 million deduction claimed in Oakbrook Land Holdings, recounted in Part II,189 is
a sufficient illustration. Tax savings of $3.3 million from that deduction would be $1.6 million
more than OLH had paid for the entire tract of land. If allowed, the deduction would produce for
Horton an outcome that, from a strictly financial -- not charitable -- perspective, was better than
anything else he might conceivably have done with the land. In contrast with Mrs. Rebay's
paintings, moreover, Horton and his colleagues have retained not only the 106 acres burdened by
the easement but the remaining thirty-seven unburdened acres as well. If the deduction had been
allowed, they would have acquired those interests at zero cost, and with a $1.6 million (tax-free)
cash subsidy from the government to boot.
185

The Senate Finance Committee Report on what became the Tax Reform Act of 1969 observed that the
charitable deduction was not
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In the current environment, little more is needed to produce such results than a parcel of
(preferably undeveloped) land and an appraisal based on a suitably inflated highest and best use
"before" valuation of the land. The facts reflected in the opinions -- from decisions like PBBMRose Hill (and before it Mountanos190) through the HRH cases and the likes of Coal Property
Holdings and on to Oakbrook Land Holdings itself -- however individuated and more or less
elaborate their separate back stories, have those two things in common; in the final analysis,
stripped of their window dressings, they all boil down to that. In that setting the emergence of the
pure SCEs chronicled in the Senate Bipartisan Report, somewhat ironically, can be viewed as a
salutary development. SCEs are not some unexpected perversion, distinguishable in principle from
non-syndicated easements, of an otherwise defensible rule; they are simply the reductio ad absurdum of allowing fair market value deductions for contributions of conservation easements attributable to unrealized appreciation in the first place. They lay bare just how vulnerable that allowance
is. The willingness of the mainstream conservation easement community to rally around efforts to
curb SCEs testifies implicitly to just how rank an embarrassment they are. Abetted by the fiction
that development rights can be more valuable than the underlying land, their emergence well and
truly let the cat out of the bag: as long as the allowance of fair market value deductions is not
tempered by taxing the corresponding gain, there is little intrinsic, palpable downside to exploiting
that vulnerability by aggressive valuation, and in principle no real limit on the deductions that taxpayers might be tempted to claim. That temptation is intensified where, as by now is well understood, the incentives facing all participants to an easement contribution -- donor, donee, appraiser,
and syndicator alike -- are aligned in the direction of inflated valuation.191
There is no reason to think that this is what Congress intended when it left the appreciated
property rule undisturbed in 1984. It acknowledged that the rule created "opportunities for overvaluation because the donor . . . does not realize capital gain equal to the appreciation." It
recognized that "these opportunities" could be quelled by eliminating "the advantage that charitable
gifts of appreciated property have over gifts of cash." It refrained, however, from taking that step, on
the premise "that many charitable organizations depend on this tax benefit for fund-raising and as a
means of acquiring valuable property."192 That rationale extends only in sharply attenuated form, if
it legitimately applies at all, to contributions of conservation easements. Recipient organizations do
regard their mission as including the receipt (and possibly the administration) of conservation
easements. But the easements themselves are not sources of support, and the recipients do not rely
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on them for that; if anything, they are a financial burden, as reflected in the practice of some organizations of requiring a monetary contribution to accompany each easement donation, to help defray
the organization's operating costs.193 Whatever philanthropic or conservation value they may have
to recipient organizations, the latter clearly do not rely on them for financial support. In that respect
the case for retaining the appreciated property rule for contributions of conservation easements in
particular is weaker than Congress hypothesized generally in 1984. Taking into account the rule's
demonstrated capacity for mischief where such contributions are concerned, running the gamut
from "wild" overvaluation to outright criminal tax fraud, the case for repealing the appreciated
property rule with respect to conservation easement contributions seems strong. There is precedent
for such selective repeal: in other situations involving contributions of capital gain property thought
to be vulnerable to abuse, Congress has done exactly that.194
D. Proposed Reforms
Short of outright repeal with respect to conservation easements, however, the appreciated
property rule should at least be curtailed where such contributions are concerned. Motivated by the
preceding analysis, we propose four remedial provisions: one would apply to conservation easements contributed by short-term owners; two would then affect contributions by longer-term
holders; a fourth would apply to appreciated easement contributions in general.
1. Short-Term: Limit Easement Contributions to Property Cost
For property recently (or contemporaneously) acquired in a taxable transaction, the
property's "fair market value," and the upper limit on a "before" valuation used to value a conservation easement, should conclusively be presumed to be the price for which the property was
acquired.195

This is the obvious, natural, readily administered starting point in valuing a

conservation easement. It would put an immediate halt to the most transparently aggressive
valuation of conservation easements contributed with respect to newly acquired property. We
would apply the limitation to all easement contributions; it would not be confined to SCEs, or to
easements granted by pass-through entities.
Given the susceptibility of easement valuations to manipulation, the initial limitation to cost
should as a prophylactic matter remain in effect for some non-trivial period of time following
acquisition.

The exact period is unavoidably arbitrary.

Borrowing from existing legislative
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proposals we suggest three years. In effect our proposal could then be viewed as modifying the
approach of bills like S. 2256, so that the deduction was limited to basis, rather than 2.5 times basis.
Alternatively viewed, it would effectively extend the short-term/long-term capital gain dividing line
from a holding period of one year to three for purposes of determining the amount allowable as a
deduction for contributing a conservation easement under I.R.C. § 170(e)(1).
For contributions made in an individual capacity, rather than through some sort of passthrough entity, the application of this rule will be straightforward. For contributions made through
any sort of pass-through entity (which in the interest of expositional simplicity we shall refer to as a
partnership) the matter could become considerably more complex, especially if interests in the
partnership are sold in taxable transactions following contribution to the partnership of the property
with respect to which the easement is to be granted. To judge from the reported decisions, the
property is typically acquired by the partnership in a non-recognition transaction that endows it with
the transferor's basis and holding period; the interests in the partnership are then sold to outside
investors, at a typically substantial markup, in taxable sales.196 In that setting there are two possible
choices in applying our proposal for (a) cost and (b) holding period. We propose using the outside
investors/partners' costs and holding periods.197 That is by far the simplest choice. And although in
theory it would allow the use of a higher value for cost, and produce a more generous limitation,
than using the partnership's inherited basis, our proposed limitation would be at least as effective as
S. 2256 at curbing SCEs. We would therefore expect them to become economically unviable and
disappear, rendering our choice of the more generous limitation moot.
2. Longer-Term: Limit Easement Contributions to Property Cost, Adjusted for
Evolution of Neighboring Housing Prices
The limitation proposed in bills like S. 2256 disappears after three years. For reasons
previously spelled out198 we do not think that is appropriate. One alternative would be to limit the
deduction to basis indefinitely. In lieu of that, however, we would allow the initial limitation to
adjust over time. Specifically, we would allow our proposed initial limitation on before valuations
to be adjusted automatically to reflect the evolution of housing prices. To a large extent those
adjustments could be made using home-price indices specialized to the geographic locale in which
the property was actually located. The Federal Reserve, for example, maintains a site devoted to
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home price indices, including at least one (and typically several) for each state, as well as at least
one index for upwards of 400 more narrowly defined locales, typically municipal or metropolitan
areas.199 At worst, then, the automatic adjustments we propose would be made using statewide
data; more typically they would be made using data for prices in a geographic area much closer to
the property in question.
With that adjustment, the maximum amount allowable as a deduction for a contributed easement would keep pace with the general growth in real estate prices over time.
3. Longer-Term: Limit Easement Contributions to Property Fair Market Value,
Determined Using Comparable Sales or Other Reliable Data
A limitation to cost, even with an adjustment based on the general change of housing prices,
will not always capture property's current fair market value accurately. So we would also allow a
different value to be established, but only by clear and convincing evidence. Adequate evidence
would include, for example, sales data for comparable property that was genuinely salient, in the
sense that the sales were proximate in both geography and time. They might also include other
factors specific to the property involved, such as the assembly of a larger parcel in a manner that
enhanced the values of the constituent individual parcels.200 At the same time, to minimize the
prospect of courts remaining bogged down in protracted litigation over value, we would curtail or
prohibit the sort of speculative, DCF-based assessments of "highest and best use" developmental
values that have plagued the valuation process and produced much of the controversy to date.
Given the extent to which such methods have been deployed to justify outlandish valuations, we
think it fair to err on the side of parsimony in allowing appraisers to justify valuations that depart
widely from original cost, adjusted for changes in housing prices over time.
4. All Easement Contributions: Impose a 5% Excise on Unrealized Appreciation
Claimed as a Deduction
While explicit limits on valuation seem both necessary and appropriate, they do not directly
address the fact that abusively valued conservation easements have flourished in part because of
their simplicity, at least compared to other tax-oriented transactions. To repeat: little more is
199
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required than a plot of land and an appraisal. The low entry cost, combined with the prospect of
instantaneous returns, has surely contributed to the explosive growth of conservation easements
generally, not just syndicated easements, over the past twenty years.
For that reason it would be desirable to alter at the threshold the calculus facing prospective
donors of conservation easements. One simple way of accomplishing that would be the imposition
of an excise or fee, based on the amount of unrealized appreciation (after an appropriate allocation
of the basis in the underlying land201) included in the amount claimed as a deduction on contributing
the easement. The excise would be levied on the donor in the year of contribution.202 To deter
playing the audit lottery with aggressive valuation, we would base the excise on the value claimed
as a deduction at the time of contribution, without any downward adjustment if the deduction were
subsequently to be reduced on audit, after litigation, or even by amendments to the tax return on
which the deduction was initially claimed.203 For a conservation easement that has been carefully
valued, the excise would alter the economics and make the deduction less valuable, but it would still
leave in place a substantial incentive to making the contribution. More importantly, it would always
leave the donor of a carefully valued easement better off than if they had refrained from making the
contribution in the first place. In the case of aggressive valuation that is vulnerable to challenge, on
the other hand, a substantial reduction in the value ultimately allowed might well leave the donor
worse off.

Consequently, what we propose would leave in place a generous incentive to

contributing conservation easements that are carefully valued, while simultaneously creating a
deterrent to overvaluing them with more traction than the existing overvaluation penalties, which
are only levied ex post.204
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203

As we have noted, some donee organizations impose an up-front fee in connection with easement contributions.
E.g., Kaufman v. Comm'r, 784 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2015) (fee equal to ten percent of the contribution). This approach
also has statutory precedent. I.R.C. § 170(f)(13)(A) already requires a $500 filing fee for each contribution of a façade
easement producing a deduction in excess of $10,000. And the proceeds regulation of Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(ii),
is a precedent for fixing the amount at the time of contribution, irrespective of any subsequent adjustment. The regulation requires that the "proportionate value of the donee's property rights shall remain constant," based on the amount
claimed as a deduction, rather than the amount eventually allowed. See, e.g., Carroll v. Comm'r, 146 T.C. 196 (2016)
(easement provision giving donee a share on extinguishment based on the deduction allowed, rather than the fair
market value of the easement at the time of contribution, did not satisfy the proceeds regulation).
Our objective here is to foreclose defensive amendments to reduce the excise made after a taxpayer has become aware that a deduction might be challenged. To that end, it might be appropriate to prohibit any defensive
amendment beyond the date of (not the date received) any notification to the taxpayer of any inquiry by the Service into
a return on which a conservation easement deduction has been claimed.
204

Compare McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 303-305.
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While the choice of rate is again somewhat arbitrary, we propose an excise of 5% of the
unrealized appreciation implicit in the contribution. Assuming (as we have) a donor taxed at a 35%
marginal rate, the operation of the excise can be illustrated in the following way.

For the

contribution of an easement valued at $1 million, with an allocated share of the basis in the
underlying property of $200,000, a 5% excise on $800,000 of unrealized appreciation would
produce a fee of $40,000.205 At 35%, on the other hand, the contribution would produce a tax
benefit of $350,000. The excise would simply reduce the net benefit of the deduction from
$350,000 to $310,000. The impact of the fee would increase with the fraction of the contribution
consisting of appreciation, reaching its maximum at a zero basis, in which event, in our example,
the fee would be $50,000, and the after-contribution after-fee net benefit would be $300,000.
If structured as we propose, with the excise based on the amount claimed rather than the
amount finally allowed as a deduction, the final value (after audit) of the tax benefit from the
deduction net of the excise would decline as the overvaluation grew. But the overall economics
would become negative only in the event of claimed deductions that were massively overvalued
compared what was found to be the "correct" value of the contributed easement.206 If in our
illustration $1 million was the easement's true fair market value, the amount claimed as a deduction
would have to exceed $7.2 million -- overvaluing the contribution by a factor of more than seven -for the after-audit tax benefit net of the excise to be negative.207 In general, the higher the ratio of
the top marginal rate to the excise rate the more extreme the overvaluation will have to be to
produce negative overall economics.208
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In contrast, the tax payable if the appreciation had been taxed as long-term gain would be $160,000.
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To take an extreme example, even if the amount of the contribution attributable to appreciation were entirely
disallowed and the deduction limited to the $200,000 basis, the $40,000 excise (based on the $1,000,000 originally
claimed) could never exceed the $70,000 tax benefit from deducting the $200,000 basis. As long as the basis was at
least $114,286, the contribution would have positive economics even if the unrealized appreciation were to be entirely
disallowed. In that event the tax benefit from the deduction would still be $114,286*0,35 = $40,000, just equal to the
excise imposed.
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In our example a $7.2 million deduction claimed for an easement with an allocable basis of $200,000 would
produce an excise of 0.05*$7 million = $350,000. If after audit the allowed deduction were reduced to the easement's
$1 million true fair market value, the tax benefit at 35% would just equal $350,000.
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A rule-of-thumb simplification is that the contribution would have to be overvalued by a factor equal to the ratio
of the taxpayer's marginal rate to the excise rate for the economics to be negative. It is more complex because the
excise rate applies to the unrealized appreciation, while the marginal benefit of the deduction is based on the entire
contribution. Taking the latter into account, it can be shown that the combination of excise and eventually allowed
deduction will have positive economics unless the overvaluation (O) satisfies

t
O > F z - (F - B),
 

where F and B are true fair market value and basis, respectively, and t and z are the tax and excise rates. In our example
t/z = 0.35/0.05 = 7, so the expression above produces O = $7 million - $800,000 = $6.2 million, and a total claimed
deduction (including both fair market value and overvaluation) of $7.2 million. If basis were 0, that would boil down

57

A provision similar to the excise we propose was previously advocated by one of us.209
What we propose here is more narrowly tailored to the problem, in that the excise would be based
on the unrealized appreciation implicit in the contribution, rather than the contribution itself. In
functional terms, either proposal is similar to a percentage reduction in the deduction allowed for
conservation easement contributions, of the sort included in a 2005 survey of tax compliance and
reform proposals by the Joint Committee on Taxation.210 What was said then about the comparative
merits of an explicit excise remains apposite now:
[T]he difference would be more than mere optics. By subjecting the prospective
donor to an excise tax based on the claimed valuation, without any prospect of a
reduction in the excise in the event that the claimed valuation was reduced, it would
associate a real cost with the position the donor takes in his return, not just with the
ultimate outcome. That . . . would induce most prospective donors at the very least
to ask, before signing, "Do I really want to claim this valuation? Because once I do
there is no turning back."211
Others have questioned the effectiveness of after-the-fact penalties at deterring easement overvaluation.212 On the evidence of recent decisions, that ineffectiveness persists. Given the low entry cost
associated with, and the immediacy of the returns promised by,213 contributions of conservation
easements, something more salient seems called for: a warning sign at the threshold, one with a
tangible cost that varied with the claimed valuation of the contribution, could by itself play an
important role in quelling conservation easement abuse. It would do so, moreover, by just modestly
attenuating, while at the same time preserving, the incentives to contributing conservation
easements, certainly for contributions that were reasonably valued. At the same time, it would
create the prospect of unfortunate consequences for easements like those found in recent cases that
have exhibited overvaluation by many multiples of the contributed easement's legitimately
defensible value.

to O = $6 million, a total claimed deduction of $7 million, and overvaluation by a factor of 7.
In practice the economics would be slightly more complex still if the basis allocated to the contributed easement increased with the claimed deduction, but the variation would favor the taxpayer by reducing the amount of the
initial excise as the allocated basis increased, reducing the amount of unrealized appreciation subject to the excise.
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Sims, Recollections, supra note 1, at 61-62.
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JCT 2005 COMPLIANCE OPTIONS, supra note 143, at 282-85. The JCT outlined a two-thirds reduction in the
amount claimed as a conservation easement deduction, roughly equivalent to a 23% excise to a 35% bracket taxpayer.
See supra note 154.
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Sims Recollections, supra note 1, at 62 (footnotes omitted).
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McLaughlin, Valuation Conundrum, supra note 3, at 302-03.
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See supra note 25.
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V.

Conclusion
In 1980, when Congress made permanent the exception to the partial interest prohibition on

charitable deductions for contributions of conservation easements, it was aware that determining
their fair market value would require a multi-step appraisal process that was more challenging than
valuing other exceptions to the partial interest limitation. Separate but roughly contemporaneous
developments reflected a growing congressional awareness of the vulnerability of charitable contributions generally to overvaluation, due to the appreciated property rule. That awareness led to the
enactment of explicit overvaluation penalties in 1981, and then to the adoption in 1984 of more
stringent requirements governing documentation of charitable contributions.
In retrospect it was probably inevitable that the inherent malleability of the appraisal process
would eventually coalesce with the appreciated property rule to generate irresistible temptations to
massive overvaluation. That is exactly what has materialized in the past twenty years: speculative
appraisals, premised on fanciful assessments of property's highest and best use, have led to conservation easements "with wildly inflated deductions on land bought at much lower prices."214 The
most egregious cases, of which there have been unfortunately many, involve claimed deductions
based on appraised values that are many multiples of the price at which the underlying, unburdened
land had recently changed hands. Such claims are intertwined with the intrinsically implausible
claim that the rights to develop land to its highest and best use can somehow be more valuable than
outright ownership of the land. Those developments have not, as is so widely assumed, been
confined to the mass-marketed syndicated easements described in detail in the Senate Bipartisan
Report. As shown in work by McLaughlin, Starkman and others, corroborated by the cases surveyed in Part III, overvaluation has been endemic to conservation easements from the start. So while
most recent attention has focused on SCEs, the problem is far more widespread.
Even though the regime of overvaluation penalties is now more stringent than when first
adopted, it (together with other administrative requirements) has obviously not thus far deterred
overvaluation. The government's enforcement efforts have been responsibly pursued; but given the
dimensions of the problem and the limitations on its resources it is probably too much to expect it to
keep up. The alternatives proposed by some critics -- ranging from challenging SCEs as shams to
litigating the value of every conservation easement -- would amount to just so much chipping away
at the margins of the problem; it would not improve on what the government has accomplished to
date. The latter would leave the government bogged down in an "inefficient, wasteful, and inherently imprecise"215 process for which "neither the Service nor the courts have sufficient resour214

Oakbrook Land Holdings, LLC v. Comm'r, 154 T.C. 180, 258 (2020) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Losch v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909, 921 (1988); see also Symington v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 892, 904 (1986)
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ces";216 and as Congress grasped when it first addressed the problem in 1981, it would tend to
induce settlement on unduly taxpayer friendly terms. The former would leave much overvaluation
completely untouched. Even proposed legislation that would limit SCE investors to deducting some
multiple of their investments would leave non-syndicated easements untouched; it might simultaneously function to legitimize overvaluation within the proposed statutory limit. Strengthening reporting and other administrative provisions to improve transparency about what is going on would
enhance the Service's ability to identity instances of overvaluation, but it would still not get at the
root of the problem.
At bottom, the engine that drives what has become relentless overvaluation of conservation
easements is the appreciated property rule. But conservation easements are not just some mine-run
species of contributed interest, more or less indistinguishable from other contributed interests, and
hence no more vulnerable to abuse. The appraisal process by which they must be valued, together
with the absence of data on market prices of comparable restrictions, effectively means that the sky
is the limit where the starting point in valuing them -- the "before" valuation -- is concerned. Given
that starting point, it has become possible in principle (and has repeatedly been attempted in
practice) to produce easement contributions with claimed before valuations so far in excess of the
market value of the underlying land as to leave the contributors better off than they would be by
doing anything else with -- including just selling -- the land.
In such circumstances there is both historical precedent and a compelling need for a legislative solution that will curb those possibilities. Drawing on other episodes that have involved
comparable abuses, we have proposed a limited set of modifications to the application of the
appreciated property rule to conservation easements. They would anchor the valuation of those
interests to a characteristic of property that is both realistic, observable, and defensible. In so doing
they would preserve the originally intended incentives of the deduction, stripped only of
unwarranted overvaluation. Calculating the "before" value of property for purposes of determining
a contribution would begin with adjusted basis, tied to the last market transaction in the property;
that value would periodically and automatically be adjusted for changes in market value. More
speculative valuations, based on DCF analyses of imagined (and imaginary) "highest and best uses,"
would no longer be allowed. As an added deterrent, we propose an upfront excise on the amount of
unrealized appreciation in a claimed donation, modest in amount but sufficiently visible to give
prospective donors pause before signing a return that claims a deduction for an overvalued
conservation easement.

The changes we propose would collectively preserve the originally

(Tannenwald, J.).
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ABA-RPTE Report, supra note 12, at 331.
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intended incentives to contribute conservation easements, while forestalling ongoing perversion of
those incentives to reap unintended, indefensibly overstated, and excessive tax benefits.
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Parcel 1
Parcel 2
Total
/Acre =

293

135

140

155

1550

Maple Landing
(07/09/2020)

Englewood Place
(07/09/2020)

Cottonwood Place
(08/04/2020)

Red Oak Estates
(08/04/2020)

194

1497

119

Riverside Place
(07/09/2020)

Average

150

175

Effingham Village
(07/09/2020)

187

135

130

283

114

165

379

388

Oakhill Woods
(2/13/2020)

Acres
Contributed
141

Acres
Transferred
145

Case
(Date of Opinion)
Belair Woods
(9/20/2018)
(07/11/2020)

Cost
Acres
3881200 1490
1008735 405
4889935 1895
2580

HRH Summary (Reported Decisions)

7

53

5

5

5

10

5

10

9

12/1/2008

12/1/2008

12/1/2008

12/1/2008

12/1/2008

12/1/2008

12/1/2009

12/31/2009

12/31/2009

7/29/2011

1/20/2010

12/30/2009

12/28/2010

12/7/2010

Not
Date of
Date of
Contributed Transfer to LLC Contribution
4
12/18/2008
12/30/2009

4,074
509
Average

395

395

970

415

394

757

371

Elapsed
Time (Days)
377

All to Georgia Land Trust
All but last two reported as appraised by David Roberts

42,534,000
5,316,750
Average

4,343,000

4,592,000

4,773,000

6,791,000

4,071,000

5,237,000

7,949,000

28,953

34,015

36,715

23,996

35,711

31,739

20,974

Deduction
Average
Claimed
Claimed/Acre
4,778,000
33,887

APPENDIX -- Contributions by HRH Investments Sponsored LLCs

2,580

2,580

2,580

2,580

2,580

2,580

2,580

0.78997
0.78997

0.07916

0.07124

0.06860

0.14934

0.06016

0.08707

0.20000

Allocable
Percentage of
Cost/Acre
Parent Parcels
2,580
0.07441

3,862,920
482,865
Average

387,066

348,359

335,457

730,265

294,170

425,773

977,987

11.01

11.22

13.18

14.23

9.30

13.84

12.30

8.13

Allocable
Ded Claimed/
Cost
Allocable Cost
363,842
13.13

